THE TROUBLE WITH TECH TRANSFER

Criticism from academics and industry, and fewer deals being made: What's going on?
By Ed Silverman


ᄅ GETTY IMAGES / JUMPSTART STUDIOS

Barry Merriman says he wants nothing to do with his university's technology transfer office. About three years ago, the researcher in the human genetics department at the University of California, Los Angeles, had developed a biochip that he believed held commercial promise. But when he tried to convince the school's tech transfer office (TTO) to proceed, he ran into a proverbial brick wall. Although he had spoken with representatives from a few corporations that had expressed interest in pursuing the technology, the university wasn't willing to move quickly.

Instead, he says, the TTO failed to recognize the potential value, balked at the cost of filing a patent application, and didn't pursue any leads, which ended up scuttling a chance to cut a licensing deal with a company. "It was a very discouraging process. We had the invention and filed a provisional patent, and everything seemed to be moving along. But then, trying to commercialize it became a problem," says Merriman, whose department is housed in the university's Geffen School of Medicine. "We told them who may be interested [in a licensing deal], but nothing came of it. We eventually got a $500,000 research grant to develop the product and so got less interested in pursuing the business angle. But it was a slower way to develop the technology. I'm philosophical about it now, but I would never work with them again." (The officials running UCLA's TTO at the time have left, and Roberto Peccei, UCLA's vice chancellor who oversaw research then and now, says he doesn't know anything about the incident.)

Such episodes reflect a growing concern about university TTOs. No one keeps data on the number of opportunities that die on the vine, but tech transfer officials are fending off growing criticism from various directions - frustrated faculty, corporate licensing specialists, and venture capitalists - resulting in their efforts to bolster university treasure chests sometimes having the opposite effect.

The list of accusations from industry officials, academics, and others ranges from incompetence to greed: TTOs allegedly employ poorly trained staffers who fail to understand what companies are seeking or are simply unresponsive to their own ambitious professors. At the same time, TTOs are being chastised for setting conditions for preliminary technology reviews that make it difficult for a company to assess commercial viability.

A more common complaint is that tech transfer officials simply bargain so hard over royalties that some companies find the terms onerous and withdraw, leaving US universities with lost opportunities. Michael Pazzani, vice president of research at Rutgers University, where he oversees tech transfer, says: "It probably is the case that foreign universities are easier to deal with over intellectual property. There is more overseas competition."

"There's an interesting dynamic at play, and it's true that universities have become, especially from industry's perspective, much more difficult to interact with," says Ross DeVol, director of regional economics at The Milken Institute, and who recently coauthored a study of technology transfer for the Los Angeles-based think tank. "The feeling is that tech transfer is increasingly bureaucratic red tape." However, the Milken Institute report doesn't specifically mention tech transfer as an obstacle, says DeVol.

By several measures, universities fared slightly worse in 2004, the last year data was available, compared with 2003, according to annual surveys of TTOs by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM). The number of universities filing up to 10 patent applications in a year dropped by roughly 25%, and there was a slight overall drop in the number of invention disclosures and startup companies formed.

"It's puzzling. Industry research and development funding is going up, but the proportion going to US universities is going down," says Alan Rappaport, a senior analyst at the National Science Foundation's science and engineering indicators program. "Why that's happening isn't clear. Maybe it's a blip, and I wouldn't be surprised if it turns up again. But the role of tech transfer does seem to have gotten thornier. There appear to be more arguments over the potential value of any breakthroughs that could be worth a lot of money."

THE GREED FACTOR

There's little question that the lure of a big payday is prompting TTOs to work harder than ever before to get better deals. Ever since the enactment of the 1980 Bayh-Dole Act, which allows universities to retain ownership of any patents that are developed using federal funds, an entrepreneurial spirit has enveloped many campuses. Some people, such as venture capitalist Steve Burrill, say that certain universities may have taken this to an extreme. He declines to specify which ones.

"I call it the greed factor. [Universities are] trying to get more money, and get it sooner. I think at many schools there's been an increasing push from the provost, who's asking about the royalty streams," says Burrill, whose San Francisco-based firm specializes in biotech deals. "And that's a barrier to guys like me, who want to pull out at the lowest possible cost. As a result, we're spending less time dealing with tech transfer."

For some schools, the recent push to bargain harder amounts to a belated recognition that their TTOs weren't always extracting the best possible terms. "In the past, a lot of technology was leaking and universities weren't modulating the flow of ideas going out the door. Now, the tech transfer offices are learning to negotiate smarter terms," says Dennis Fernandez, a former venture capitalist and now a patent attorney in Silicon Valley, who works closely with such universities as Stanford and Northwestern. "They're seeking stock in startups in lieu of cash, offering exclusives to company A even when company B funded the research, or [they're] requiring performance milestones against tangible benchmarks." Fernandez declines to give specific examples.

One university official argues that running a TTO is expensive. As companies get more aggressive about challenging each other's patents, universities are increasingly forced to spend more money to nail down rights that can't later be challenged. As Kathryn Atchison, vice provost of intellectual property and industry relations at UCLA notes, "That's expensive. It can run $20,000 to $100,000 for one invention. Somebody has to bear the cost, and that has to be recovered."

"Let's be real about this," says Nikki Borman, a former tech transfer official at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who is now head of the biomedical strategy group at PriceWaterhouseCoopers in Boston. "As a tech transfer official, you're obligated to find the best partners and incentivize inventors."

PUSHING COMPANIES OVERSEAS?

The hardball approach, however, may be prompting more companies to consider trolling for inventions overseas, simply because some foreign universities are perceived as more willing to agree to industry terms. For instance, a university in Europe or Asia may be willing to assign ownership of the patent to the company sponsoring research, whereas a university in the United States is more likely to offer only an option to negotiate a royalty-bearing license, says Susan Butts, senior director of external science and technology programs at Dow Chemical in Midland, Mich. "There can be an enormous difference," she says, "and there were times where we've walked away from deals."

A study by Marie Thursby, professor of strategic management at Georgia Tech College, and Jerry Thursby, professor and chair of economics at Emory University, found that the quality of R&D personnel available and opportunities for university collaboration are often the most important reasons for companies locating their R&D in foreign countries such as China and India.

Companies cite other explanations for pursuing technology at overseas universities, including the desire to increase investments in such developing markets, where new research centers are being built or an increasing number of clinical trials are held. For now, though, information technology companies are thought to be conducting more of these forays rather than pharmaceutical or biotech companies, although some suggest this could change as overseas advances in stem cell research continues to outpace work being done in the United States.

Stan Williams, senior fellow and research director at Hewlett-Packard in Palo Alto, Calif., says the issue transcends mere competition. He suggests that tech transfer officials (he declined to identify them) should take a few courses in business fundamentals. Williams argues that industry wouldn't be so tempted to look overseas if universities understood how companies must do business. In his view, university TTOs too often prolong negotiations to the point that an invention becomes less desirable and legal fees become too steep. In other instances, Williams says, a university insists that his company pay for patent application fees, which can amount to more than the agreed amount of research funding but wouldn't include licensing rights.

"Unfortunately, the vast majority of tech transfer employees are amateurs," says Williams. "Too often, they're looking for the big score to make them a ton of money, but what winds up happening is they lose money for their offices, and the poor professor (who invented some technology) is left gnashing his teeth. This behavior has limited the number of universities we will work with." He declined to identify them.

Other companies complain that tech transfer employees appear clueless about basic corporate interests. Robert Gould, vice president of licensing and external research at Merck, says he's regularly frustrated by what he calls the data dump: In response to a request for information about recent university research, he'll receive a huge, unsorted file of patent applications that are all over the scientific map. "Rarely do I get an advance phone call from tech transfer asking what we're looking for," says Gould, who works at the New Jersey drug maker's research center in Boston. "It would be very helpful if intellectual property papers were organized thematically; by that I mean according to the type of disease the discovery might target, such as diabetes or oncology. It doesn't happen often enough."

THE RESPONSE

One tech transfer official scoffs at the criticism. "I happen to think it's bollocks, to be perfectly honest," says John Fraser, a former venture capitalist who is also the executive director of the office of intellectual property development and commercialization at Florida State University in Tallahassee, and president of AUTM. He argues that any increased interest in overseas universities merely reflects the growing amount of brain power that can be found at those institutions, not roadblocks that TTOs create in the United States. "And let's not forget that foreign-based multinationals also want to be here," he says, "so there's a bit of a balance."

Fraser maintains that tech transfer is doing its job and cites recent figures to back his claims. Between 2000 and 2004, the last year for which data were available, the average number of invention disclosures and new patent applications increased, according to AUTM's annual surveys of TTOs. However, the average number of licenses or options executed declined. Fraser acknowledges that the response rate to the surveys is only about 50%, which would indicate that even more licensing and startup activity doesn't get counted.

"There are valid gripes on both sides. But you need communications skills when you tell a professor you won't pay for a patent, even if the discovery looks good in the petri dish. It's like telling somebody their baby is ugly." -Susan Patow

As for being difficult, Fraser reacts as if the industry pot is calling the tech transfer kettle black. When it comes to deals involving information technology companies, Fraser charges that industry is just as much of a problem. The fast-paced nature of the business makes companies want to move so quickly that tech transfer offices simply can't be expected to respond. And while pharmaceutical companies may have much longer time horizons, recent financial pressures are forcing them to haggle endlessly with universities over royalties. The difference, Fraser notes, between a percentage point or two can be significant over time. "I understand that some institutions may be difficult and that tech transfer might contribute to the problem, but it's not the biggest piece," he says. "Keep in mind that we're not competing against each other. It's not as if I have the same technology as the university down the road. And I assure you that no one has an incentive to sit on their tush and make a deal go away."

A FAILURE - AND A SUCCESS

Tell that to William Catalona. For the past few years, the renowned researcher, who is credited with developing the prostate-specific antigen (PSA) test for prostate cancer, has been embroiled in a lawsuit with his former employer, Washington University, over the use of patient tissue samples. At issue was the value of about 2,000 samples Catalona wanted to send to a biotech that hoped to use them to test a new assay. But in 2001, a tech transfer official at the university's TTO balked at the idea and called it unacceptable, because the samples involved were allegedly worth at least $100,000, according to an E-mail written by the official.

"I remember that shortly after the Bayh-Dole Act passed, there was one person in a dingy office. We were on a first-name basis and it was very mom-and-pop like," says Catalona, who is now at Northwestern University's Feinberg School of Medicine in Chicago. "But later, tech transfer had to earn its keep. They had these pressures to close deals and ensure the university got as much as possible. Eventually, the office became an obstacle to me. I wasn't interested much in royalties or licenses. I wanted to get the science done. But they stalled and stalled, and I couldn't provide the samples."

A Washington University spokeswoman declined to comment, citing the ongoing litigation, although the university Web site has a special section devoted to the lawsuit. A question-and-answer section maintains that the prospects for receiving any licensing income from the thousands of tissue samples are "slim to none." The spokeswoman noted, however, that the university has prevailed so far: A federal court in Missouri last year ruled the tissue samples belong to the university. Catalona is appealing.

"Look, I can see how university rights need to be protected. And somebody has to pay for those employees," says Catalona. "But in this case, the university somehow went off the deep end and subordinated the rights of patients to its own interests. I understand this is a very big business for universities and pharmaceutical companies and biotechs. And I think tech transfer is fine, as long as it doesn't get in the way of doing science. But for scientists, it's a real conundrum."

Of course, some encounters with TTOs do produce happy endings. Take the case of Jan Vilcek. In 2005, the 73-year-old Holocaust survivor pledged $105 million to the New York University (NYU) School of Medicine, where he works as a microbiology professor. The money will come from royalties he's earned from Remicade, a medication used to treat rheumatoid arthritis, Crohn disease, and other ailments. He and a colleague developed a chemical that Centocor, which is now a Johnson & Johnson unit, turned into the drug.

Remicade became available in 1998 and has since been a big seller, generating about $2.1 billion in revenue in 2005 in the United States while generating royalties for both Vilcek and NYU. As he sees it, the decision to donate the money was an easy one. He's grateful to NYU for employing him after he escaped the Communist regime in the former Czechoslovakia and arrived in New York in 1965, and the TTO has helped make it possible for him to become wealthy.

"There's probably not a universal formula that works for everyone," says Vilcek, "but my advice is, if an academic investigator believes they have something to offer, they should explore the possibilities and not be afraid to work with the tech transfer office or the biotech or pharma company. My experience was that even though the licensing agreement was designed for us to provide products, we also learned from the company."

Other universities are revamping. Rutgers' Pazzani, for instance, is developing a new template for contracts that can be signed in a day. Since arriving at UCLA two years ago, Atchison is sponsoring seminars for industry - think of a salon, not a job fair - to highlight inventions and faculty. Also, the tech transfer team is working harder to befriend their own professors, visiting them in their labs in hopes of building comfort levels and soliciting invention disclosures, which she says jumped to nearly 300 in 2006 (from 190 two years earlier). "We're trying to do more outreach with everyone," says Atchison, "faculty and companies."

Such efforts, however, may be too little too late for Barry Merriman. The UCLA researcher has soured on working with the TTO: "I have zero dealings with that office," he says, "and when I do invent something, next time I'll find a way to patent it myself, not through UCLA."


Have a comment? Click here





Advertisement


 

Rate this article

Rating: 2.21/5 (14 votes )





non-zero sum and non-exclusive enabling technology
by Lance Irby

[Comment posted 2008-03-31 21:07:56]

Do we miss the point and muddy the water when the focus is how best divide the pie? Where has the public seen the most benefit from University research commercialization? Why? AUTM's latest survey measures TTO "activity" along with license revenues. Using a baseball analogy, On-base-percentage is a better indicator than batting average to determine a hitter's probability to score runs. With new surveys and cumalative success stories we may better see the value of university commercialization in the capacity to create the more desirable non-exclusive enabling technologies that go to market sooner with higher quality impact and fewer costs. Creative integrated collaborations are already taking place in tech transfer and increasingly are leading to better understanding of this non-zero sum game and how the public can most benefit. (example see AUTM's Better World report - BEVS baculovirus expression vector system)

"Lance Irby"

ps. From my local Kansas City area other examples are taking place that focus on integrated collaboration and non-exclusive technology that will exponentially increase the efficiency of tech transfer. KU's cancer center is NIC certified and using collaborative interdisciplinary peer reviewed teams to speed drug discovery and the Kauffman Foundation's www.ibridgenetwork.org is working towards a web 3.0 semantic version of university tech transfer. Carl Schramm, the head of the foundation, is leading the way in this area. Laura Paglione is managing the project.

Any other web projects in this area? Please contact me: lanceirby@yahoo.com





To "Worse of Tech Transfer"
by univ admin

[Comment posted 2007-08-07 13:13:11]

Your assumption in using commercial services is that the University will continue to front patent costs. Universities obviously prefer to front patent cost only when they control the licensing process with their own TTO.

As most "commercial services" are individual consultant types, they clearly do not have the assets to make the patent investments that a university does. Even if they did, their annual cash flow from licensing would be so low as to not even make a dent into the patent expenses.

Only a university can take the inherent risk in investing money into ideas that may or may not generate license revenue. To offload the licensing aspect to someone who does not share in that risk is simply bad business.





They are trying...
by Tracy

[Comment posted 2007-06-27 15:52:08]

See the following:
http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/21798.wss





Greed
by Gordon Couger

[Comment posted 2007-06-20 00:58:27]

Universities aren't willing to kiss enough frogs to find the princess. You make money a nickel and dime at a time on the low level research level tranfering it industry. They have the big eye on wanting to make it all one one deal. After all it's is not there money.

Unless you can put in someone's hands ready for marketing you don't have lot to sell.

Gordon Couger
Stillwater OK.





And in Industry (and at NIH)?
by David Kiszkiss

[Comment posted 2007-06-19 17:00:13]

My personal experience suggests that you will find as many scientists bemoaning their organizations failure to capitalize on good ideas in industry as in academia. Rarely does a group of scientists or administrators with the power to apply significant resources agree that an idea is worth pursuing.
( By the way, isn't that the same rap laid on NIH study sections?).





Worse of academic technology transfer
by x

[Comment posted 2007-06-19 16:59:46]

curren situation: they do not know what they are doing and they have no modivation for doing it; they have interest in serving neither university employees nor university as a whole. there is no penalty or reward for better or worse of their job performance.

results: inventors and unversities lost on competiveness; discoraging innovations; university lost income

solution: use commercial services for technology transfer services, university will merely play an administrative role





Overcoming the Industry - Research Sector Divide -
by Rowan Gilmore

[Comment posted 2007-02-27 06:07:10]

Our organisation has brokered and helped to negotiate nearly 30 deals during the past year with tech transfer offices, and rarely has the challenge been negotiating a good price. The greater challenge is keeping all three parties on the same page. Three parties, you ask? Yes, there's the business that wants the product, the TTO, and the researcher. Rarely are their interests aligned. We've written up our experiences and anecdotes on the AIC website:

http://www.ausicom.com/01_cms/details.asp?ID=628

We've found that an independent intermediary can bring focus and a good dose of realism to what in more cases than not, will usually fall over.





President, Your Coaching Edge
by John Jenkins

[Comment posted 2007-02-01 20:49:40]

As a business coach providing customized training to (academic) technology commercialization organizations, I don't concur with all of assertions in, "The Trouble With Tech Transfer." However, I believe there are several points worthy of further dialogue among those of us involved in technology commercialization.

I strongly recommend that the article, and resulting comments, be used in strategic planning discussions by all TTO teams.

And may I propose a couple of other candidate discussion topics?

1) While I agree that market pull, not technology push is THE underlying critical element in successful commercialization, I disagree with the implication that technology push is synonymous with marketing efforts performed by TTOs and researchers.

TTOs need an active, organized marketing program (not merely passive efforts such as putting IP on a web site for whoever might stumble onto them) in order to effectively commercializae IP. An active marketing program consists of properly trained marketers CONSISTENTLY using effective marketing tools, procedures and resources.

2) I agree that academic TTO compensation packages need to addressed. Most new TT team members are not properly prepared for the many varied business and technical tasks that are required of them. Once they develop the necessary skills to perform their jobs effectively they leave, due primarily to better opportunites in the private sector. (The fact that my coaching business thrives is in part a testament to this revolving door which keeps bringing me new client prospects.)

A critical element which should be considererd for TTO compensation is a performance incentive. A properly defined incentive package would support it's own costs and, just as importantly, would change the relationship between TTO and researchers - from the current stereotypical frictional co-dependence, to more of a synergistic partnership.

John Jenkins
www.yourcoachingedge.com





Director of Licensing, UCLA OIP
by Emily Loughran

[Comment posted 2007-01-30 19:37:28]

As a Director of Licensing who has worked with university technology transfer for 14 years, I certainly recognize the frustration on both sides of the negotiation. I would like to correct a couple of assertions regarding Mr. Merrimanᅡメs situation. Rather than ᅡモbalk(ing) at the cost of filing a patent applicationᅡヤ, UCLA filed a US patent application that is currently pending in the USPTO. UCLA further marketed the technology for 30 months after the filing of the provisional application before dropping the foreign filings due to lack of commercial interest among the 36 companies to which it had been marketed. To support Susan Patow, it is very difficult for faculty to understand why brilliant science may not be the next commercial hit. University technology transfer traverses a delicate balance between supporting the faculty and stewarding precious university resources





Retired High Technology CEO and Technology Transfer Officer
by Richard A. Callahan PhD

[Comment posted 2007-01-25 18:27:04]

Topical and interesting Article; I offer the following comments:

1. Bayh-Dole got it right; the commercial development of publically funded university technology is an obligation to the American people, not an option. I felt the article did not pay enough attention to the tremendous contribution Technology Transfer has made to American Universities, faculty and to the economy. A single line comparing pre and post Bayh-Dole would have been useful.

2. Many TTO's are greatly understaffed with people naive in both science and business. The root cause of this problem is the poor salary structure in all but a few TTO offices. The TTO offices at MIT and Stanford seldom receive credible negative comments. MIT and Stanford correctly perceive the role of technology commercialization as a duty that must be properly funded.

3. Negative comments from Companies and Venture groups are always worth consideration but must be held suspect. Both entities profit when they weaken the position of TTO's. The accusation of greed from the Venture Community is similar to being called overweight by a glutton. I have many friends in the venture community that deserve and receive my thanks and admiration for their contributions to our common successes. However, the venture industry has but one goal and purpose; return on investment. Maximizing this return is not only their fiducial obligation to their investors; it is their ONLY purpose. This legitimate and necessary role becomes unpalatable when VC's fiegn altruism or attempt to deny other members of the commercial partnership (inventor's, universities and industry) their fair share of the rewards. A look at the net worth of every successful General Partner provides a view of the fruits of avarice. Yet your article portrays a VC's accusation of widespread university greed as if it were unbiased.

4. Most TTO's do not have the resources to develop all of the disclosed inventions. Ms. Patow correctly describes denied inventors as feeling personally affronted and too often reacting unprofessionally when their inventions are turned down by the TTO. The misdirected anger of Professor Merriman may be an example of this. He and UCLA would benefit by constructively working to correct the problems encountered commercializing his technology. Is it the technology or the TTO that is the problem? Your article appears to blame the TTO office. It is as least as likely the technology is not commercial. This appears to be a UCLA problem and I found it's inclusion in the article gratuitous.

Most faculty that successfully commercialize technology approach the commercialization task with the same zeal and focus that they approach the task of obtaining research funding. Both tasks are difficult and frustrating by their nature.

Speak to an inventor scholar that has successfullly spun technologies out of a University. I think you will find they will attest that it is among the most difficult tasks they have ever accomplished. Most will tell you that publishing in Science and Nature is easy by comparison.

5. I found the comments relating to the emerging off shore competition to US Universities provocative. I would be most interested in reading articles that further developed this topic.

I believe the article would have benefitted from a more critical analysis of these factors.





Trouble with a very few University TLO's
by Charles Cook, Licensing Associate, small institution

[Comment posted 2007-01-25 17:46:24]

by Charlie Cook, a U.S. University TLO Professional

I subscribe to the accurate comments posted by John Fraser FSU/AUTM and I am awestruck by NYU's Jan Vilcek.

The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 is the most inspired, economic development legislation to be enacted by the U.S. Congress. Bayh-Dole is the envy of both many of my overseas TLO colleagues and my University's overseas licensing partners.

The typical University TLO in the U.S. produces new, annual, and most welcomed revenue streams for both its institution and faculty that are many, many times the total operating budget of the TLO. These economic development accomplishments of the TLO are completed without getting in the way of either the science or the publication thereof.

Perhaps the disgruntled investigators highlighted by Ed Silverman in his "The Trouble with Tech Transfer" article have accepted positions at the wrong institutions?





To Dr. Wade
by university administrator

[Comment posted 2007-01-24 18:08:56]

Requesting a business plan and insurance is not greed.

The business plan would allow RU to understand the development path for the compound. Without it, how could RU understand what actions you intend to do (if any) with the rights to the compound.

The insurance is intended to protect you and the RU. Should someone choose to sue you over your actions with the compound or over effects of the compound, RU would probably be included in the lawsuit (since RU's endowment would be a much greater target than your own assets).






Tech Non-Transfer at Rockefeller University
by David Wade, Ph.D.

[Comment posted 2007-01-23 22:47:06]

This article highlighted a problem that I encountered with the Technology Transfer Office (TTO) at Rocefeller University (RU) in 2003. When I was a postdoc there in the lab of Nobel Laureate, R.B. Merrifeld, I helped invent a new type of antibiotic against which microbes have a very difficult, if not impossible, time to develop resistance. The novel antibiotic was patented by RU in 1996, and I am coinventor on the patent. However, when I contacted the TTO at RU about licensing the invention I helped create, they told me that I first had to get $2 million in insurance plus let them see my business plan. I appealed to the then new President of RU, Nobelist Paul Nurse, but he did not want to make waves in his new job, so he did not go against the RU TTO. All of this turned me off, and the invention was not licensed. Consequently, there is an invention that could be used immediately in the battle against the worldwide epidemic of antibiotic-resistant microbes, whose development was paid for by US taxpayers, but that is not being allowed to benefit those taxpayers simply because of the greed of RU.





Comment on tech transfer
by Dr. Norman G. Anderson

[Comment posted 2007-01-23 22:12:31]

Has anyone listed the total costs of University tech transfer and the income gained in the US by year? My impression is that TT is, overall, a loss generating activity, and that income, even minor, is rare. The field, like Las Vegas, is driven by exceptions and illusory expectations. There has not been a proper scientific study of it, as is also true of peer review.





Univeristies are NOT the handmaidens of industry!
by Despairing Researcher

[Comment posted 2007-01-23 16:48:08]

Doesn't anyone else see what a devil's bargain has been made here? Why in the world should the university be able to keep something that it did nothing to foster? Not ONE PENNY of my salary or research funds come from my nominative employer - it's all paid for by the taxpayers. Why should the patent rights not revert to them (that's us, remember?) since that's who paid the freight? The money could be used to fund future research or to keep the price of the finished drug or technology affordable. A much more equitable arrangement, in my view.

The large sums of potential money have already ruined basic science departments all over the country. The pressure used to be to publish, then to get more and bigger NIH grants, and now it's to provide the university with an income stream. Academics and scholarship wither when your faculty's only value is whether it can produce something some company will want to license and pay the university a handsome royalty for. This is not the purpose of a univerisity or its faculty.

The mad pursuit of profit has just about killed basic research, and I've been on the front lines watching its slow and agonizing demise. Exactly what will there be to transfer when the research that made it all possible can no longer find funding or any place interested in hiring the basic scientists whose aim is the advancement of human knowledge, not the enrichment those who know the price of everything and the value of nothing?





As I see it
by The Commentator

[Comment posted 2007-01-21 13:18:51]

Biotechnology startups operate in the red, are unable to successfully develop products, and require outside support to sustain basic operations.
Venture capitalists have a decrease in IPOs, cannot match returns of hedge funds, and charge limited partners 2% of invested funds as fees and keep 20% of profits (if any).

Add these two groups of executives and financiers to the list of poorly trained, greedy "professionals" lacking any business acumen.





The problem with the deal
by mmm

[Comment posted 2007-01-21 12:40:24]

Here's my two cents:
* Businesses expecting "good" deals fail to recognize that a "business good deal" is not the same as the "university good deal." This is especially true for company's seeking ownership rights in inventions. Here's why.

First, the fruits of the joint development are already lopsided. University's usually recognize that fees and royalties from the company merely augment resources made available to the researchers in the first place from tuition, tax dollars, scholarships, grants, etc. Companies recognize this too (otherwise they'd invest the money internally). Companies expecting exclusive rights, let alone ownership, are wrong-headed.

Second, when it comes to licensing, companies and universities interests also diverge even on basic things like the economics. TTOs, while interested in the bottom line, are nevertheless subsidized and can afford to hold out for a good deal. Again, companies, on the other hand, view the available technology as "it's available, you're not making any money now, here's what I can offer." This point is illustrated perfectly by an earlier commenter. A good friend of mine told me once that given the incentives, when a company bargains with a TTO, the company should be prepared to approach licensing as if it's licensing material from a competitor

A third point to consider when dealing with TTOs is that they frequently have fewer actual resources to dedicate to negotiate than companies actually realize. If the TTO has a form license agreement, start there. Don't propose your own terms. It's wasteful and, more likely than not, you're going to simply prolong negotiations. On this same point, certain terms are usually simply not negotiable (much): indemnificaiton, disclaimer of warranties, bayh-dole, retention of ownership, taxes, waiver of liability, etc. Companies that attempt to make changes to those provisions usually become quickly frustrated (see 2 above).





The Reaction of a Technology Development Consultant
by Paul Waugaman

[Comment posted 2007-01-21 12:28:05]

Our firm, Technology Commercialization Group, LLC works with a diverse group of research organizations, including universities and small-to-mid-size businesses which seek our expertise to help them maximize the value of their technology assets. We often negotiate licenses and other technology development and collaborative arrangements, evaluate early-stage technology and market opportunities, and evaluate the performance and effectiveness of technology transfer programs and initiatives. In my past, I have managed university technology transfer programs and benchmarked technology transfer performance and practices. My partners have had experience organizing and managing start-up companies based on university technologies. The anecdotes included in this article do not surprise us. Everyone who has been in the business of technology transfer through patenting and licensing has their own horror stories and knows there are more out there; but does recounting them make things better? Good points have been raised by other commentators, and I will try not to duplicate theirs. However, I have a few points to make:

In recent years, university technology transfer offices (TTOᅡメs) have hired more industry-savvy staff, and tried to become more ᅡモtransparentᅡヤ to business. TTOᅡメs are getting better.

In recent years, universities have been more creative in business development and providing gap funding for inventions; making it easier to spin out new inventions in small companies, and make their inventions more valuable.

Deal flow (licenses and new start-ups which are also licenses at heart) is more dependent on market pull than technology push (marketing efforts by TTOᅡメs and inventors). Thus business conditions ᅡヨ availability of capital and risk tolerance among venture finance sources ᅡヨ have more to do with deal flow than institutional greed and mismanagement on the part of universities. We believe that most valuable technology will get licensed whether it is because of or in spite of TTO performance

Institutional leadership is critical. A university CEO or governing board that embraces technology commercialization and economic development as a valid institutional mission; and then backs statements up with actions and policy reforms sends a powerful message to the faculty and administrators within the institution, and to stakeholders outside the institution. When this happens, good things usually happen.

Realistic universities usually realize that they probably will not prosper financially from technology transfer. It is fatally unrealistic to hope that license revenues will replace declining revenues for research from the usual sources (government grants, foundations, business sponsors). Royalty-sharing sends a large stream of revenues to inventors, and operational costs eat up a share. Indeed, most institutions do not break even. Our studies of AUTM technology transfer data and National Science Foundation research expenditure data reveal that only a small percentage of universities probably broke even on a current-year basis in 2002; and only a handful of institutions took in more than 5% of their total research expenditure in gross licensing revenue in 2002. realistic universities view technology transfer by patenting and licensing as one of a variety of necessary functions that strengthen their research enterprise, making them more competitive in a highly competitive arena; and as one ᅡモpower supplyᅡヤ for their role as an engine of economic development.

In fact the significant mission of a TTO should be to AVOID the kind of horror stories Silvermanᅡメs article featured. The fact that many of the universities featured in the article have changed leadership since the reported incidents is significant.





Disappointing
by Jane Brian

[Comment posted 2007-01-19 12:15:20]

Why not write an article on how to solve the problems identified on both sides of the table, rather than encourage the lack of understanding and maintaining the barrier to innovation with single person quotes and inflammatory statements? The article was disappointing and useless to those in this field, whether from industry or academia.






The trouble with tech transfer
by Ihor Boszko

[Comment posted 2007-01-19 00:42:34]

I would agree with several points made in this article, based on my personal experience as a business development professional at a diagnostics company. In the short time that I have been doing licensing in this industry, I have found that technology transfer offices are, in general, the most difficult type of party to deal with.

I agree with Steve Burrill ᅡヨ the greed factor is definitely there. A recent trend I have noticed in licensing of genetic content is that tech transfer offices are licensing patent applications without any consideration to the validity of the IP. So what they are trying to do is grab as much money as possible very early on, before the patents undergo changes during prosecution or actually issue. These parties (at least in my experience) are typically not willing to tie the majority of payments to the part that actually generates value ᅡヨ valid IP! However, I think this greed factor is part of a bigger problem.

Most of the other comments quoted in the article are related to what has been my biggest beef with dealing with tech transfer folks (and you mention this in the article) ᅡヨ the majority of tech transfer offices I have dealt with are staffed by inexperienced people with too much work to do! Sure, Iᅡメve come across great people at tech transfer offices, but Iᅡメve found they often do not last long in that position because they are snapped up by industry. I should mention that when I do hit upon one of these good people, who knows what theyᅡメre doing, the negotiation is a real pleasure!

So, due to turn-over, the inexperienced newbies are left to do out-licensing at tech transfer offices. Their lack of negotiation skills, poor understanding of industry norms and trends and pressure to look good by generating as much revenue for the university as possible per license, leads to positional and short-sighted negotiations.

Making tech transfer jobs more attractive by offering salaries competitive with commercial entities and valuing business development experience would go a long way to helping universities maximize the value of their intellectual property portfolio. It also makes for a far more interesting job for those of us who negotiate licenses with tech transfer offices for a living.






The business language its not welcome in the campus
by Antonio Teixeira

[Comment posted 2007-01-18 20:51:35]

The US universities TTOᅡᄡs are a kind a good example for European Universities TTO's but it seems there are the same problems.
Technology transfer its not a University role because its an activity that requires highly professionalized staff (well payed and well motivated) and must be market oriented.
Nowadays the industry invests seriously to setting up R&D departments focused in the development of new products and services and this requires entrepreneurial activity for the modern TTO. The old TTO do not understand this and have a aggressive defensive position. The Universities must understand that their intelectual assets its like stock options. We must invest and sometimes we loose, sometimes we gain! In my opinion supported by my TTO experience this mean that Universities Technology Transfer activities needs to be managed by a private company licensed and authorized to do that oustside the campus. The business language its not welcome in the campus.





Trouble with Technology Transfer?
by John Fraser

[Comment posted 2007-01-15 21:30:03]

Ed Silvermanᅡメs article entitled ᅡモThe Trouble with Tech Transferᅡヤ does not put the subject in context and focuses only on anecdotal evidence. Remember that the plural of anecdote is NOT data.

Academic Tech Transfer Offices were set up by institutions in response to the Bayh-Dole Act. The Economist Magazine Technology Quarterly proclaimed: ᅡモPossibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be enacted in America over the past half-century was the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. ---this unlocked all the inventions and discoveries that had been made in laboratories throughout the United States with the help of taxpayers money. More than anything, this single policy helped reverse Americaᅡメs precipitous slide into industrial irrelevance.ᅡヤ The forthcoming AUTM US Annual Survey will record for fiscal year 2005: 28,349 current, active commercialization licenses ᅡヨ each representing a university ᅡヨ company relationship to develop a product to benefit people; a total of 3,641 such new products in the marketplace since 1998; a total of 5,171 new spinout companies based on academic research created since 1980, each creating economic activity in its region.

In the US, this is an enormous endeavour involving over 190 research universities across all states. Add the tech transfer opportunities poring out of the 700 research centers and laboratories of federal departments and agencies conducting more than $100 billion in R&D annually and the thousands of small and medium sized companies innovating with us and others and you see a significant part of the innovation-driven US economy.

Trouble in such a vast enterprise? ᅡヨ Of course!

It is to be expected in something involving some many clever, driven people working across disparate organizations over vast distances. But remember ᅡヨ it works! And is playing an important role in saving lives, improving the quality of life and increasing productivity and competitiveness.

Want specific examples of success? click on http://www.betterworldproject.net/, and http://www.federallabs.org/pdf/Federal_T2_2005.pdf.

AUTM ( http://www.autm.net ) is a nonprofit professional association with membership of more than 3,600 intellectual property managers and business executives from 45 countries. The associationᅡメs mission is to advance the field of technology transfer, and enhance our ability to bring academic and nonprofit research to people around the world. I am the current, elected President, a volunteer position.





Reported Deal Flow
by Gerald Barnett

[Comment posted 2007-01-12 02:24:20]

It is worth acknowledging that tech transfer can work differently--and perhaps a lot better--than it is (or isn't). It is also worth acknowledging that in general getting any new, largely untested research technology into any other use environment--let alone commercial development--is difficult, takes time, and is expensive, no matter who controls any associated IP. A "tech transfer" office may get blamed (as may IP or even a sponsored projects office), but it doesn't mean that absent these, things would be humming along.

It is worth asking whether deal flow is also affected by inventors refusing to participate in institutional reporting of IP (for whatever reason), by selectivity of transfer organizations in deciding what IP to make deals on (much to the outrage of those passed up), by the quality of inventions reported to institutions (hard to do deals with a dead parrot portfolio), by institutions allowing more work to go out without IP formalities (hey, open collaboration), and by a slow down in the expansion of tech transfer activities toward a steady state (fewer new offices, less institutional investment)? Any one of these may factors may also contribute, and perhaps be much more significant that the factors singled out in the article, for all their emotional appeal.

It also appears that deals pick up in areas where there is a rapidly emerging industry sector relying on university research--biotech in the 80s, internet in the mid to late 90s. Could overall reported deal flow be an index of a concerning industrial outlook--not as many new industry initiatives tied to university research, lack of an IPO market, or even broad, changes in allocation of research funding?





Expediting Technology Transfer Thru Small changes in Research Process
by Rod Strand

[Comment posted 2007-01-10 20:29:36]

Having worked at a national laboratory, as a researcher at a University, and for many years in private sector, the observation I've made on Tech Transfer is that the gap between licensing and successful research can be bridged if the process of research funds also the development of data packages that update the drawings and necessary documentation for presenting the potential licensee with the specifications for the technology to be transferred. The private sector will bear the costs of updating documentation. However, time to making that decision is substantially reduced if the as-builts, drawings, documentation are package with the technology before it is presented as a product by the tech transfer folks.





Chief Technical Officer/Technical Consultant
by Geoffrey Brooks

[Comment posted 2007-01-10 14:12:08]

I personally have tried to work the mechanics of "contract R&D" at a University. The company I work for is in chemical specialty business.

One of the main issues is that the University assumes that if you are interested in something, that it is "worth" a lot to you and you will make lots of money and we, the University, want to get our fair (more than!) share.

When one is trying to research something new, there is no guarantee that the idea/concept can be reduced to practise in an affordable manner, and that even if it is, that it will achieve commercial success.

One has the choice of doing the R&D in house (if one has the skills/time/resources available) or contracting it out. The more "blue sky" the idea the greater the risk of failing commercially. At that time I decided that we were prepared to invest $250,000 in a three year program using a University - with the hope that commercial success resulted (that would take another 3 to 5 years). We were expected to pay for all the patent work, yet the University would own the rights (and the ability to sell them elsewhere), we were expected to pay royalties on commercial sales (no real issue with that), but the "benchmarking" issue which meant the University would like some up front payouts on a timely basis (above funding). One of the attractions of the University was they were equipped to do the initial pilot plant development work, if the idea was feasible.

We could not reach an agreement as to what form the material would be used in and how any payments be calculated - either on the raw material itself - or - on the the finished delivery vehicle/formulation (the part of the program we would have to invest in and execute in house). Significant monies would have to be spent to do all the saftey testing, environmental testing, efficacy testing one would have to do to register the material with the relevant authorities (TSCA, REACH). The saftey regulatory part of the investment is not cheap ($250,000 would be a conservative (low) estimate for a "safe" ingredient) which we would commision and pay for, but the University wanted to own the rights to the data. We would have had to dedicate a staff person (and pay for them) to monitoring progress and keeping to timelines, planning the marketing, essentially mamaging the program

Unfortunately, my company decided to abandon this line of research as it seemed to be too difficult to reach a "fair deal" with University. Whereas as a company we were prepared to invest significant funds in new developments (assuming the commercialization seemed feasible) outside our organization, and we had rated the chance of commercial success of the proposed program at 20% (better than that expected for normal new product development) at that time. However, we were not prepared to mortgage the future profitability of the program, if succesful, especially when you consider that it would probably take 10 years to excecute.





Technology Transfer
by James A. Poulos, III, University of Maryland, College Park, Office of Technology Commercialization

[Comment posted 2007-01-09 20:33:35]

One of the articulated complaints of industry is that the Universities will not give up IP in exchange for research dollars. This is of course not true, and not all fields of industry have this complaint. We will and do give up IP when it is prudent to do so. In general, it may be prudent to surrender IP when i) a company comes to a University with its own technology and seeks assistance in improving company technology; ii) a particular company comes with a demonstrated, superior and dominating patent position and seeks University expertise in exchange for funded research; iii) when a company for example obtains access to technology primarily via cross licensing e.g. telecommunication and iv) we are asked to assist in conducting or running human or animal trials under the protocol of a company.
However, I have had demands from company officials who want to spend $30K on research and want all of the IP. Such limited funding does not cover the salary and overhead of a graduate student. In such an instance, I do not believe it appropriate to surrender IP.






Correction: Georgia Institute of Technology
by Andy

[Comment posted 2007-01-04 15:24:14]

Please note that there is no Georgia Tech College-- Marie Thursby is with the Georgia Institute of Technology College of Management.