bioterrorism

With a global alarm ringing because of an unprecedented outbreak of monkeypox, we should also consider a different but closely related viral threat.

The House of Commons rebuked the president of the Canadian Public Health Agency for not turning over sensitive information pertaining to the dismissal of government scientists from the National Microbiology Laboratory.

To protect against biological threats, federal agencies and other key stakeholders should commit to a strategic, unified approach.

Ebola, MERS, and enterovirus D68; polio eradication efforts; new regulations on potentially dangerous research

The Dutch scientist who mutated a strain of the avian flu virus to be transmissible between mammals is headed to appeals court to protect his right to publish the work unimpeded.

The discovery of a new form of the deadly botulinum toxin gets published, but its sequence is kept under wraps until an antidote is developed.

Contestants criticize the organization and scoring of a Pentagon competition challenging scientists to detect bioterrorism threats by analyzing DNA sequences.

The National Institutes of Health reveals a controversial plan to regulate the funding of H5N1 research.

A new technique simplifies and accelerates the development of tests for identifying potential biological weapons.

Federal officials will release harmless bacteria into subway tunnels beneath the Northeastern city to test new sensors designed to detect biological agents.

Silk impregnated with bleach may provide a new way to fight the formidable spores of the anthrax bacterium.

Biosecurity board recommends publication of data detailing transmissibility of H5N1 avian influenza.

Asking pointed questions is a key part of the scientific process.

The creation of H5N1 bird flu strains that are transmissible between mammals has thrown the scientific community into a heated debate about whether such research should be allowed and how it should be regulated.

NSABB and Congress members voice their opinions about the new developments in the H5N1 research debate.

The US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity explains why it recommended redacting the details of studies reporting on a highly transmissible H5N1 strain.

Japanese virologist Yoshihiro Kawaoka, who led one of the recent studies on avian flu transmissibility, says that type of research is necessary.

Three dozen researchers have signed a letter promising to halt dangerous bird flu research for 2 months to initiate safety discussions.