Biodiversity Treaty: A 'Lose-Lose' Proposition For U.S. Consumers, Scientists, And Industry

Consumers, Scientists, And Industry Author: Henry I. Miller. The 1992 "Biodiversity Treaty," rejected by the Bush administration but signed by President Clinton, faces opposition to ratification in the Republican-controlled Senate. But the treaty, a lose-lose proposition for United States consumers, scientists, and industry alike, is a bad idea that won't die. It remains high on the administration's agenda. Speaking at Stanford University on April 26, Tim Wirth, undersecretary of state for global affairs, said it has the "top priority among all treaties" and agreements awaiting confirmation. Moreover, Vice President Al Gore is known to be willing to make almost any political deal for its approval. The treaty (more formally, the Convention on Biological Diversity) addresses a broad spectrum of issues related to the protection of biological diversity. These include the conservation of habitats in developing nations and the availability of resources to make this possible. The treaty was conceived as an unprecedented opportunity for industrialized and developing countries to reconcile issues of conservation and access to biological resources. However, it is burdened with the problematic question of an international biosafety protocol--in other words, regulations--for biotechnology, which, in any case, has little to do with biodiversity. The kind of biosafety regulation being contemplated--for example, covering field trials of improved varieties of potatoes, corn, rice, or cassava--would discourage innovative research and development; commit the signatory nations to a poorly conceived, highest-common-denominator level of regulation; and deprive domestic regulatory agencies of discretion in setting regulatory policy. The international bureaucrats discussing the form and implementation of a biosafety protocol clearly reveal their misguided intentions in an official description of the April 1993 proceedings of an expert panel established to implement these aspects of the treaty. According to paragraphs 57 and 58 of the summary, "a majority of the Panel members believed the organisms covered by a possible protocol should be restricted to genetically modified organisms," along the lines of the European Union's approach. The latter defines what is regulated not by risk-related criteria, but according to whether molecular techniques of genetic manipulation have been used. The panel notes explicitly that the scope of regulation "does not include organisms modified by traditional breeding methods," regardless of pathogenicity, likelihood of constituting an environmental nuisance, or other potential risks. This approach has been widely discredited, the scientific consensus holding that there is no conceptual difference between organisms crafted with older techniques (such as mutagenesis or hybridization) and the newer techniques (such as gene-splicing), and that regulation should be risk-based. The panel took little notice of a minority viewpoint cited in the report that the scope of regulation proposed was unscientific and "would ignore organisms actually known to present a threat to biodiversity, while focusing on others for which only hypothetical analyses can be offered." (In support of the minority view, consider the irony that the bacteria that cause anthrax or bubonic plague could be tested--for example, as a pesticide--without regulation, while a field trial of a gene- spliced, extended-shelf-life tomato would require a government review.) The wrong-headed regulation in the making would hurt R&D in ways not limited to the developing world, or even to international transfers and transactions. Paragraphs 74 and 75 of the panel report observe ominously that "a majority of the Panel members interpreted the [treaty] language . . . as if both international transfer of organisms and domestic handling and use of organisms were covered. The majority of the Panel members thought that domestic regulation should be covered by a possible protocol" (emphasis added). The primary goals of the treaty are laudable, but the mechanisms provided to accomplish them are vague or impotent, while the biosafety protocol is an imminent hazard to the diffusion of biotechnology through the developing world. Its ability to enhance safety in the developing world is extremely doubtful, and the likelihood of its being cost-effective, nil. Moreover, the protocol's possible jurisdiction over strictly domestic activities could effectively take away individual nations' ability to adopt rational policies, thus discouraging innovation. Ironically, the protocol would stifle development of environmentally friendly biotech innovations that can help clean up toxic wastes, purify water, and displace agricultural chemicals--products especially needed in the developing world. The treaty is far more likely to cause harm than to make significant inroads toward its goals. It should be abandoned and a new, sound one renegotiated. Henry I. Miller is Robert Wesson Fellow of Scientific Philosophy and Public Policy at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. E-mail: miller@hoover.stanford.edu. Reprints of a longer version of this article, "Is the Biodiversity Treaty a Bureaucratic Time Bomb?" (Hoover Institution Essays in Public Policy, 1995), may be obtained from the author. (The Scientist, Vol:9, #12, pg.13, June 12, 1995) (Copyright, The Scientist, Inc.) garfield@aurora.cis.upenn.edu 71764.2561@compuserve.com The Scientist, 3600 Market Street, Suite 450, Philadelphia, PA 19104 U.S.A.

Biodiversity Treaty: A 'Lose-Lose' Proposition For U.S. Consumers, Scientists, And Industry

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