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NIH’s Draft Biosafety Policy Needs Researcher Input

Proposed changes to NIH biosafety oversight could affect researcher privacy, intellectual property, incident reporting, and the speed of institutional review.

Written byAntony Schwartz, PhD
| 6 min read
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More than half a century ago, scientists working on emerging biotechnology gathered with lawyers and physicians to discuss the risks associated with recombinant DNA technology. The 1975 Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA has since become a prominent example of scientists responding to uncertainty about the risks of emerging biotechnology through voluntary restraint, deliberation, and proportionate controls. The National Institutes of Health (NIH) followed in 1976 with guidelines governing recombinant DNA research conducted with NIH funding that imposed stricter restrictions on experiments, containment conditions, and administrative oversight.

In the decades since, biomedical research has advanced with oversight by local Institutional Biosafety Committees (IBCs) and, when required, the NIH Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee. IBCs assess risks associated with recombinant and synthetic nucleic acids and organisms containing them, considering the biological material, facilities, personnel expertise, and proposed work when determining appropriate containment. Institutions receiving NIH funding for research involving recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid molecules must comply with the NIH Guidelines, which then apply to all such research conducted at or sponsored by the institution. IBCs must also report certain exposures and releases, along with corrective actions.

As biotechnology has evolved, the NIH Guidelines have been revised repeatedly. In September 2025, the NIH Office of Science Policy began an effort to modernize biosafety to keep pace with rapidly advancing science and technology. After months of stakeholder engagement, NIH released its Draft NIH Biosafety Policy for Research Involving Biohazards on August 19, 2026.

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The proposed policy addresses several longstanding challenges, but it may also affect researchers in ways that are not yet fully appreciated. As an Institutional Biosafety Officer whose responsibilities include biosafety, biosecurity, dual-use research, and oversight of high-consequence pathogens, I have seen how policy requirements translate into research practice. This proposal, together with other recent federal policies governing high-risk life sciences research, needs broader engagement from the research community because it raises important questions about balancing transparency with researcher safety and intellectual property protection, as well as meaningful risk-based oversight with administrative burden. Public comments are being accepted through October 19, 2026, and researchers should strongly consider weighing in on the proposed changes.

Public Transparency versus Researcher Safety and Intellectual Property

The draft policy requires public posting of IBC meeting minutes without redacting information such as Principal Investigators’ (PIs) names, biological agents, and grant numbers. Notably, public posting of IBC meeting minutes has already been required since June 1, 2025. When carefully implemented, such transparency can help the public understand how IBCs evaluate biomedical research and recommend appropriate biocontainment practices. However, the proposed requirement to also publicly post incident reports, which can describe exposures, injuries, releases, and other incidents involving covered material, expands that transparency mandate in ways that could have unintended consequences.

NIH proposes that incidents be reported using a standardized template. Although personally identifiable information about affected lab members is not included, the template requires information such as the PI’s name, grant number, general location, and position titles of involved individuals. In a small laboratory, that combination of information could make an individual readily identifiable and potentially expose researchers to targeting by people who misunderstand the approved research, its risks, or the circumstances of an incident. Researchers have faced well-documented threats from animal rights extremists, making these concerns more than hypothetical.1 The possibility of public identification could also discourage reporting, undermining one of the most important functions of institutional biosafety programs because biosafety professionals rely on these reports to investigate individual events, identify trends, recommend mitigation measures, and develop training that prevents future injuries, exposures, and releases.

Currently, identifiable information associated with these events is handled sensitively during reporting, investigation, and response, an approach that supports the trust and open communication necessary for researchers to report problems without fear of public exposure. Depending on the circumstances, medical information may also be protected under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).

Similar concerns arise with projects involving Select Agents and Toxins, which are federally regulated biological agents and toxins that can pose a severe threat to public, animal, or plant health. The draft policy expands IBC oversight to additional research involving these materials and does not exempt that research from the public posting requirements for IBC records. Previously, Select Agent projects required IBC review only when they involved recombinant materials. Under the draft policy, IBC oversight would extend to Select Agent toxins and wild type Select Agent biological agents that cause disease in humans, even when recombinant materials are not involved. That expansion raises questions about consistency with federal biosecurity measures intended to prevent unauthorized access to restricted biological agents and toxins. Researchers granted access to these materials undergo federal security risk assessments, including background screening, and adhere to extensive security requirements, while those with access to higher-risk Tier 1 Select Agents and Toxins, a subset considered to pose the greatest risk of deliberate misuse, are also subject to personnel suitability requirements. Publicly linking these researchers to specific agents, projects, and laboratories could create additional security vulnerabilities by making it easier to identify individuals with access to these materials and the laboratories where they work.

The concern also extends to intellectual property. Federally funded institutions that meet certain funding thresholds are required to maintain research security programs designed to protect scientific research, intellectual property, and research products from inappropriate access or transfer. Yet standardized IBC minutes and incident reports posted publicly could make this information easier to collect and aggregate at scale.

Although the policy directs institutions not to disclose proprietary information, it also requires sufficient descriptions of proposed work, associated risks, and mitigation measures. Increasingly sophisticated artificial intelligence tools could make it easier to aggregate and analyze this information across institutions, creating potential cyberbiosecurity, intellectual property, and physical security concerns that should be considered alongside the benefits of transparency.

Administrative Burden Instead of Risk-Based Oversight

The draft policy significantly expands IBC responsibilities compared with the current NIH Guidelines and introduces more prescriptive recordkeeping requirements. The current NIH Guidelines focus primarily on a defined subset of recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid research. If it goes into effect, its scope would extend IBC oversight beyond recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid research to include wild type biological agents that cause disease in humans, toxins, and genetically modified cells, viruses, and organisms other than plants.

Institutions have historically relied on biological safety professionals as subject matter experts to review research, conduct risk assessments, and recommend appropriate mitigation measures, allowing biological hazards to be addressed as they arise without requiring every activity to pass through a committee that may meet only periodically. Expanding the scope of mandatory IBC oversight could create bottlenecks without additional resources. Although the draft policy permits delegated review, that process still requires IBC oversight and documentation, so delegation alone does not eliminate the additional workload created by the expanded scope.

For PIs and research teams already working under grant deadlines, publication pressures, and other requirements, additional committee oversight can affect how quickly research begins and progresses. At the same time, biosafety resources spent processing lower-risk activities through formal administrative mechanisms are unavailable for higher-risk work requiring greater technical attention.

Currently, Principal Investigators are required to register certain non-exempt recombinant or synthetic nucleic acid experiments with the IBC. The draft policy limits registrations to three years, after which a new registration must be submitted and approved, increasing recurring reviews even when research has not materially changed. At many institutions, PIs already update registrations through amendments, with annual laboratory evaluations providing another opportunity to identify changes in research activities. Mandatory expiration and full resubmission may therefore add substantial work without necessarily producing corresponding risk reduction.

Recordkeeping requirements create another challenge because the draft policy ties IBC records, including meeting minutes and incident reports, to individual grants and stages of the grant lifecycle, while also recognizing that longer retention periods may be required under the NIH Grants Policy Statement. These requirements cross administrative boundaries that have typically been managed separately, with Sponsored Programs offices managing grant terms and conditions while IBC and biosafety offices oversee biological risk and biocontainment practices. Because biosafety personnel may not have sufficient visibility into individual grant requirements to determine how long particular records must be retained, compliance may require new coordination among IBCs, biosafety offices, Sponsored Programs staff, and PIs. This could add administrative work for both research and compliance teams.

Researchers Have a Stake in Shaping the Final Policy

Biosafety oversight works best when it directs attention and resources toward the activities that present meaningful risk. Transparency and accountability are important, but they should be implemented in ways that preserve researcher safety, encourage reporting, protect valuable research, and allow institutions to focus their oversight where it matters most.

NIH should therefore take a more nuanced approach to public incident reporting. If public posting remains part of the final policy, researchers should advocate for anonymized, aggregated reporting, with identifiable information disclosed only when there is a legitimate need to know, such as during a public health investigation. For recordkeeping, NIH could establish a clear baseline retention period and clarify how longer grant-specific requirements should apply when IBC registrations cover multiple projects or funding sources.

Additional oversight requirements without corresponding resources can also affect researchers because biosafety professionals must address expanding responsibilities within limited institutional capacity. Researchers should therefore advocate for resources that support institutional biosafety and oversight teams and minimize the impact of these requirements on the progress of their research.

Researchers directly affected by this policy still have time to help shape its final form. NIH is accepting public comments through October 19, 2026, and researchers should review the proposal and provide feedback on how these requirements could affect their work, their institutions, and the conduct of biomedical research.

Disclaimer: The author’s title and affiliations are provided for identification purposes only; the views expressed by the individual in this article are theirs alone and do not reflect the views of Duke University or any of its constituent institutions. Antony Schwartz serves as President-Elect of ABSA International; the views expressed are his own and do not represent ABSA International or any other organization with which he is affiliated.

  1. Bailey MR, et al. Crisis planning to manage risks posed by animal rights extremists. ILAR J. 2010;51(2):138–148.
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Meet the Author

  • A photograph of a man with short dark hair and dark eyes smiling at the camera. He is wearing a navy suit jacket over a collared shirt with a dark red tie and is in front of a gray background.

    Antony Schwartz is Duke University’s Institutional Biosafety Officer, Director, Biological Safety Division, and an adjunct assistant professor in the Duke University School of Medicine. An NIH-trained biosafety professional and microbiologist, his work spans biosafety, biosecurity, dual-use research, Select Agent oversight, and high-containment laboratories. He has contributed to national and international discussions on biorisk management policy, research oversight, and the safe conduct of biomedical research in government, academic, and healthcare environments.

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