Genetic Disturbance

I would like to take exception to the views presented by Garland E. Allen in the February 6, 1989, issue of The Scientist (page 9). Allen sees a resurgence in both the scientific and the popular presses, of reports of new evidence suggesting genetic contributions to the development and expression of complex social behaviors, such as alcoholism, shyness, and manic depressive illness. Allen finds the appearance of these reports threatening to the public, in that historically such ideas were used for political purposes to “blame the victim” and turn attention away from the failure of government to moderate environmental contributions to social problems. Allen is, I believe, rightfully concerned about the potential misuses of science, but to lump together all research on the genetic bases of social behavior and reject it on the grounds of being both poor science and poor politics is absurd and inflammatory. I believe that attacks such as his do as much harm to science and society as some of the more extreme statements that he fears. Allen says that “if the genetic studies were clear, there would be no ideological reason to reject claims that certain human behaviors are hereditary.” But it is clear that he does not mean what he says, for the standards he sets for the acceptance of such hypotheses make it virtually impossible to even legitimately pursue the topic. It is true that social behavior is hard to define, and yes, social behavior by definition takes place in a social context that cannot be duplicated in controlled laboratory studies (and no, we are not going to selectively breed people and rear them in a variety of environmentally controlled settings). But that does not mean, as Allen states, that there is “no clearcut or meaningful data to support the, claims,” or that the new results are “no more conclusive than the results of eugenicists 50 years ago. Just as we cannot test the theory of evolution by any single, elegantly controlled laboratory experiment, no one study or methodology is going to conclusively demonstrate a significant, identifiable genetic contribution to social behavior. But as we accept evolutionary theory based on the multitude of complementary and converging results that come from amvariety of methodologies, we are in a position to do the same regarding the hypothesis of a genetic contribution to the expression of social behaviors in addition to twin studies—which Dr. Allen eschews completely—there are adoption studies, family and genealogical studies, longitudinal studies, crosscultural studies, animal selection and cross-fostering studies, biochemical, and now even human genetic studies. No one who has done his or her homework should have any doubt that there is a genetic component to schizophrenia, Huntington’s chorea, alcoholism, and even shyness. Dr. Allen additionally makes a mistake in assuming that the belief in a genetic contribution to social behavior is more likely to invite “victim blaming” than is the belief that behavior is totally learned. I think our experience with alcoholism is a case in point; people are in general, more sympathetic to the problems of alcoholics and their families when they believe that aleoholism is a disease than when they believe it is due to a lack of willpower, environmental contingencies, or a person’s active choice to avoid the challenges of life. To ridicule the efforts of researchers and health care personnel who believe that “understanding the genetic basis of antisocial behavior” would be helpful in counseling is unkind and antiproductive. The suggestion that counseling could help prevent people “from carrying out their biological destiny” is a clear acknowledgement from the research community that biology is not destiny. Allen’s conclusion is that “there is every reason to oppose the widespread dissemination of studies purporting to show genetically based behavioral traits on scientific evidence alone.” I could not more heartily disagree. The answer to preventing political misuse of science is not to censor the results of one or more branches of science, but to more broadly educate people about its methods and limitations. I don’t believe it is the responsibility of scientists .“to prevent.. .dangerous ideas from creeping back into science and.. .our society,” as if we were somehow the Keepers of Truth. Rather, we can play a more active role in getting people to question various “Truths” and to become more interested in the process of science as well as its “products.” LINDA MEALEY Deptartment of Psychology College of St. Benedict St. Joseph, Minn. S6374 Animal Rights

Genetic Disturbance

Interested in reading more?

Become a Member of