Leo Szilard: The First Pugwash

The Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs turns 30 on July 7. Leo Szilard, the physicist who since 1945 had been proposing just such a meeting of Russian and Western scientists to discuss arms control, was on hand at the first Pugwash gathering, called by Bertrand Russell and financed by Cyrus Eaton. One of the key figures in the Manhattan Project, Szilard had turned his considerable talents and energy to helping the world learn how to "live with the bomb." On August 15, 1957 he drafted a long letter to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists regarding his impressions of the first Pugwash meeting. The following excerpts from that letter are taken from Toward a Livable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control (MIT Press, 1987) edited by Helen S. Hawkins and others. The last issue of the Bulletin contained a description of the Pugwash meeting written by Eugene Rabinowitch which was mainly concerned with the official sessions and did not cover the informal discussions that may have exceeded them in importance. These informal discussions, in which a man would listen and then respond with a frown or a smile without having to say anything, were—to me—more revealing than the public sessions. The Pugwash meeting was the first international meeting of scientists where it was possible for us to explore in this manner each other's mind. When I arrived at Pugwash, I was somewhat apprehensive that when we got into the discussion of highly controversial issues—as indeed we must if we wished to come to grips with the real issues—our Russian colleagues might give forth the Russian government's publicly stated views, in which case the American delegates would have almost no choice but to present the views which [the] American government has publicly stated. If that happened the meeting would have lost its usefulness. For this reason it seemed to me that it would be very important to start off on the right foot.... At breakfast on the first day of the meeting, I sat across the table from one of the Russian delegates and I asked him whether he thought the meeting should attempt to issue a public statement upon its conclusion. Then I said that since I anticipated that the Russians would be in favor of this I had prepared in advance of the meeting a statement suitable for publication and I planned to move its adoption when the meeting convened. The response to this was—quite legitimately—a frown. I then proceeded to say that I was not able to draft one statement to which everybody would agree but that I drafted two very simple statements; one to which the Russians could agree, and one to which the Americans could agree. One of these reads: "We do not believe in Capitalism," and this could be signed by all American delegates. The other reads: "We do not believe in Communism," and this could be signed by all Russian delegates. For clearly no one knows better the drawbacks of Capitalism than the Americans, who have lived under the system for a long, long time, and by now the Russians should also know the drawbacks of Communism. As I said this I looked at the Russian delegate to whom I spoke and I was satisfied that he got the point. To my mind, the issues of stopping bomb tests provides more an outlet for emotions than it offers guidance to the solution of the real issues that we must face. Sitting across the luncheon table from two Russian delegates, I asked them whether they were really sincere in their insistence that bomb tests must stop. "This," I said, "I find a little difficult to believe because it is rather obvious that if Russia wanted us to stop testing our bombs, it is within their power to do so. Why does Russia not use this power?" In response to the question put to me by their raised eyebrows, I explained what I meant: "The Atomic Energy Commission of the United States has officially stated what they consider to be the maximum permissible level of radioactivity beyond which the fallout from further tests becomes definitely harmful. Therefore, all that you Russians have to do is to take a few hydrogen bombs—of the dirty kind—out of your stockpiles and detonate them one after the other until the fall-out from these bomb tests raises the level of radioactivity up to this maximum permissible level. That should put an end to our testing further bombs." I liked their response. At the official session many of my colleagues expressed the view that the most important single step in combatting the peril of atomic bombs and hydrogen bombs (which we were all agreed represent a clear and present danger) would be the conclusion of an agreement between America, Russia, and England that they will stop testing bombs. Not until the sessions were all over and we had our dinner … did I feel disposed to take issue with this view. On that occasion I reminded them of the simple truth that a single bomb exploded in war for purposes of destruction may kill anywhere between 10,000 and a million people, depending on how it is used, whereas the same bomb exploded in a test is, in comparison utterly harmless. I asked them whether they did not think that the clear and present danger which mankind faces could be eliminated not so much by stopping the testing of bombs but rather by doing exactly the contrary; this peril would be eliminated if Russia, America and England went ahead and tested every single bomb that they have at present in their stockpiles. I hoped for assent but got only applause.... It seems absurd to say that if we want to convince the Russians that we have no stockpiles of hidden bombs … we should not be able to do so … Suppose that … the President of the United States goes before the American people and explains to them that it is in the interests of America and of the world to rid the world of bombs, but that America has entered into [such an] agreement because it is in her interest to do so, that she wants to keep the agreement, and wants to convince Russia that there are no hidden stockpiles anywhere, or that if there are some hidden stockpiles that they will be discovered in a very short time. Therefore, the President calls upon every patriotic citizen to cooperate with the International Control Commission that has been set up to advise this Control Commission of any hidden stockpiles of bombs if they should know about such stockpiles or if they should be able to discover some. The President would make it clear that there would be not the slightest objection if Russia or the United Nations offered high monetary rewards for such information, and that the President will recommend to Congress legislation which will exempt such rewards from the United States income tax. I am personally convinced, as I told the Russian delegates, that under these circum stances no stockpiles could remain hidden in America for long. I believe I have succeeded through these informal discussions in convincing the Russian delegates that I was not anti-Russian. And I found that as soon as they were convinced of this they were willing to listen to anything I had to say. From then on I was able to discuss with them highly controversial and touchy subjects and they were willing to examine the arguments that I put forward, even though they ran contrary to the type of arguments they were accustomed to hear. Such an attitude is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for a successful exchange of opinions in an international meeting of this kind in which an unprecedented situation will demand—if the problems posed are to be solved—new attitudes on the part of the governments as well as a willingness to adopt if necessary unprecedented measures. Upon the conclusion of the conference a statement was issued which I did not sign. My main reason for not signing were the references contained in the statement about bomb tests. These references, both as to the effect of fall-out and the political desirability of stopping the bomb tests were, I thought, more misleading than enlightening. It is customary for statesmen to issue misleading statements for the purpose of leading the people to the right conclusions on the basis of the wrong premises. I feel rather strongly that scientists should not emulate statesmen in this respect. Had it not been for these references, I would have signed the statement even though it did not say very much that is worth saying.... A meeting somewhat similar to the Pugwash meeting could be far more productive if it were clear from the outset that the communique to be issued when the meeting is over will list issues on which the delegates are agreed as being the most important issues that must be settled, describing the different points of view that were expressed, as well as important lines of thought that were presented. Such a meeting could indeed be exceedingly useful particularly if it were attended not only by scientists who are free from governmental ties and, therefore, free to experiment with thought, but also by observers who are either opinion-makers or men who are concerned with policy making on a governmental or semi-governmental level. Any major thoughts that were developed at such a meeting could then filter through the observers to the general public and to the governments involved. Copyright © 1987 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Reprinted by permission. See also "The Pugwash Conference Turns 30" by Frank Barnaby.

Leo Szilard: The First Pugwash

Interested in reading more?

Become a Member of