Editor's Note: Owing to an editing error, an erroneous version of the following letter appeared in the July 8, 1996, issue of The Scientist (page 12). Below is the correct version of the letter. In his May 13, 1996, letter to The Scientist (page 12), Arthur W. Galston still appears somewhat confused about what ethical theories can teach us. As I stated in my previous letter, moral practices are not theories (B. Everill, The Scientist, April 1, 1996, page 13). They are accounts of nothing more

Due to an editing error, this is an erroneous version of the letter. The corrected version can be found in the September 2, 1996 issue of The Scientist In his May 13, 1996, letter to The Scientist (page 12), Arthur W. Galston still appears somewhat confused about what ethical theories can teach us. As I stated in my previous letter: moral practices are not theories (B. Everill, The Scientist, April 1, 1996, page 13). They are accounts of nothing more than themselves. I agree with Galston's st

In his letter (The Scientist, Feb. 5, 1996, page 13) Arthur W. Galston appears to be of the opinion that "scientists ought to learn something about ethical theories" before they can "venture ethical pronouncements on that subject." Could Galston be a little confused about what constitutes a moral problem and, further, how we should go about solving such a problem? Perhaps Galston, like so many contemporary moral philosophers, has fallen for the idea that if there is no agreement on an issue, w