On Form and Substance in the Life Sciences

Illustration: A. Canamucio In a recent issue of The Scientist, an opinion article by Raymond J. O'Connor suggests that, in contrast to biomedical research, ecology has lagged behind the surging advances of most of the life sciences.1 O'Connor's main argument for the putative lag of ecological sciences is the failure to distinguish form from substance in the hypothetico-deductive research that drives most current scientific endeavors. Categorizing most ecological sciences as descriptive and possibly dull and most biomedical research as analytical and explanatory may lead to the spread of common misconceptions about ecology as a science and its characteristic differences with biomedical research. I would like to provide a different perspective on the subject, which I believe is essential given that the reading audience may be, by and large, from areas outside the ecological sciences. I believe O'Connor's article raises two central questions common to all scientific fields: These are "How should science explain the natural world?" and "How should society discriminate successful from unsuccessful science?" O'Connor's argument seems, however, to be embedded in the old false dichotomies between molecular and organismal, and between basic and applied sciences, too often promoted in most academic institutions. My intention here is to address those questions with special reference to the ecological sciences and biomedical research. To the question "Are there fundamental differences between ecological sciences and biomedical research?" the answer is a definite YES. To the question "Are those differences related to how science is carried on?" as suggested by O'Connor, the answer is a definite NO. Two major differences can be drawn between ecological and biomedical research. One difference relates to the level of organization at which each field focuses its questions. Most biomedical research focuses at the molecular and cellular levels, and occasionally at the level of individuals. In contrast, ecological science tends to focus its questions at higher levels of organization, mainly at the level of populations, communities, and ecosystems. The second distinction relates to the specific goal of each field. Ecology shares its goal with most life sciences, from molecular biology to neurosciences and environmental biology; that goal is the understanding of nature. On the other hand, biomedical research, as an applied field, is mission oriented; its goal is to provide solutions to specific medical problems (e.g., obesity, multiple sclerosis, or cancer). The finding of biomedical solutions translates into immediate benefits to humanity and, in general, into rapid economic returns for the companies funding a substantial proportion of that research. In a society with a flourishing economic growth and that is too often guided through materialistic goals, the root of the problem presented here may be in our common tendency to equalize success in science with technological advances, probably because the latter usually translates directly into money. O'Connor clearly describes how major advances in science occur by testing process-related hypotheses that will ultimately provide explanations leading to generalizations about how nature works. I agree that too often, research programs do not develop and test hypotheses through a process of rigorous analysis and logical thinking. However, it is misleading to believe this problem is within the exclusive realm of ecological and environmental sciences. A quick look at specialized journals from all life sciences, from molecular to ecological, would show abundant examples far from hypothesis-driven research. I believe the appropriate dichotomy to be emphasized should be high-quality science versus mediocre science, instead of "successful life sciences" (molecular and biomedical research) versus ecological sciences. The false dichotomy between basic and applied sciences may have led us to have a generalized misconception about the currency of science. The currency of science is knowledge, not technology (and, even less, money). The two major examples highlighted in O'Connor's article, the development of PCR and the completion of the human genome, are clear examples of such misconceptions. The development of PCR is presented as a breakthrough of first order, akin to the discovery of a new phenomenon in physics. I cannot disagree more! The revolutionary aspect of PCR is in the applicability that this technique has had in most fields of the life sciences. What may be compared to the discovery of a new phenomenon in physics is the elucidation of the process that leads to the perpetuation of DNA in life (i.e., DNA replication), not the ingenious application of that knowledge to solve a particular task (e.g., the amplification of a target DNA sequence). The triumph of the mapping of the human genome is another clear example of the general misconception about the currency of science. After the elucidation of the structure of the DNA by Watson and Crick in 1953, and the introduction of sequencing protocols by Maxam and Gilbert, and Sanger and colleagues in 1977, obtaining the complete DNA sequence of the human genome became a question of time, not science. O'Connor concludes his article suggesting that only a change of approach by substituting the "What?" questions that supposedly dominate contemporary ecology with the "How?" and "Why?" questions that characterize "good" (biomedical) research will move Ecology to the forefront of life sciences. It seems ironic that Ernst Mayr (an ecologist and evolutionary biologist) was the first who identified in 1961 the "What?" the "How?" and the "Why?" questions to tackle the problem of causation in the life sciences.2 Those questions were, however, seen as complementary in any scientific enquire, since as Mayr stated, "no biological phenomenon is fully explained until both proximate and ultimate causations are illuminated."3 The distinction between biomedical/molecular research on one side and ecological/environmental sciences on the other becomes irrelevant as research programs increasingly cross boundaries among different fields of the life sciences. Research programs in molecular ecology, environmental toxicology, comparative genomics, molecular systematics, neuroethology, conservation genetics, microbial ecology, and biocomplexity, among many others, emphasize the benefits of interdisciplinary research for a complete understanding of life processes. I would argue that evolutionary biology is the unifying field that gives cohesion to all life sciences.4 Regardless to the level of the biological hierarchy to which it is applied (from molecular to ecosystems) evolutionary biology provides the conceptual framework for integrating the "What?" and the "How?" with "Why?" questions. Some may argue that evolutionary biology is far from having direct input on biomedical research. However, studies on the evolution of disease resistance5,6 and evolutionary genomics7 provide clear examples of the advantages of using an evolutionary framework in biomedical research. I believe the key issue is not only distinguishing between form and substance, but also identifying what is form and what is substance in the life sciences. As members of the scientific community, we need to decide what we should regard as form and substance; this may dictate the future of the life sciences. The triumph of the mapping of the human genome may be a starting point for addressing this issue. To some (myself included) this is a magnificent technological achievement opening infinite doors for doing science with substance. As for the achievement itself, I do not see a lot of substance in it. Our anthropocentric ego may lead us to believe this is the most important scientific achievement in human history. However, the article reporting this achievement could simply be entitled, as O'Connor would say, "Reporting the 35th case study of a (almost) complete genome." Juan L. Bouzat, Ph.D. (jbouzat@bgnet.bgsu.edu), is an assistant professor in the department of biological sciences at Bowling Green State University, Ohio. References: 1. R.J. O'Connor, "Why ecology lags behind biology," The Scientist, 14[20]:35, Oct. 16, 2000. 2. E. Mayr, "Cause and effect in biology: kinds of causes, predictability, and teleology are viewed by a practicing biologist," Science, 134:1501-6, 1961. 3. E. Mayr, This is Biology, Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1997. 4. D.J. Futuyma, "The uses of evolutionary biology," Science, 267:41-2, 1995. 5. W.M. Fitch et al., "Positive Darwinian evolution in human influenza A viruses," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 88:4270-4, 1991. 6. F. Gao et al., "Origin of HIV-1 in the chimpanzee Pan troglodytes," Nature, 397:436-41, 1999. 7. G. Emilien et al., "Impact of genomics on drug discovery and clinical medicine," Quarterly Journal of Medicine, 93:391-423, 2000.

On Form and Substance in the Life Sciences

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