Choices on Biosecurity

This issue of The Scientist focuses on biosecurity. More specifically, it deals with the handling and detection of select agents, a catalog of about 80 bacteria, viruses, fungi, and toxins that US authorities have identified as particularly high-risk. See page 12 for a primer.Select agents divide the US research community like few other topics. Regulations for their transport and handling are considered either prudent or draconian, a minor inconvenience or a grave impediment, depending on who you ask (the article on page 45 could help you make up your mind). And debate is raging over the planned order-of-magnitude increase in the biosafety level (BSL-) 3 and 4 lab space being built to house research on select agents. Why is such capacity needed, and who is going to staff these labs? The opposing arguments are thrashed out on page 48.There is also discord over research. One area of feverish activity is the development of biosensors that will screen for and alert us against biological attack (see p. 36). In this field, for every scientist who boasts of designing a sensor that will eventually detect any of the many hundreds of species that need monitoring, another will retort that the boaster has been watching too much Star Trek.Researchers are facing many issues, including the imposition of new rules in handling select agents, the publication of data, and the free flow of researchers into the United States. These matters are encapsulated in Al Teich's Opinion on page 8.We recently polled our readers on their attitudes about bioterrorism (see p. 12). This is not just a sampling of US-based scientists. We received written comments from readers in 17 countries, indicating that it is an issue of global concern. And those comments underscored the schism.The bones of the opinion poll: Four out of five believe that a) bioterror is a very real threat, and b) the sums being spent to combat it are justified. Two-thirds of those who expressed an opinion felt that funds were being diverted from important areas of research.Let me nail my colors to the mast here: I disagree with the majority of readers.Yes, there's a risk. But as to the level of that risk, we have seen no appraisal, no attempt to assess it alongside other dangers using a methodology that we all can examine and comprehend. In its place we get tub-thumping, chest-beating, flag-waving rhetoric. Here's a recent example:1"... We're here today to discuss an issue of the highest importance and that, of course, is protecting our great country from the threats of bioterrorism. As you all know, our highest priority is to safeguard the American people. This is a responsibility that President Bush takes extremely seriously, and he wants us to make sure that we are prepared ...."1In the United States, at least, the public is being whipped into frenzied concern over the threat – always unquantified – to national security. And, as the poll shows, even our readers are buying it. One reader urges that the government should spend the money necessary for research and planning related to any potential threat, something that is simply impossible to do. Another promotes self-censorship: "Ways must be found to limit the availability of sensitive research results to the public ...." It is no wonder that the national security is being presented as the centerpiece of a political campaign, including promises to plug alleged gaps in biodefenses.Is it possible that we could have a more measured public debate? A more objective assessment of the threat? The scientific community could, and should, take a lead in calling for this, both individually and collectively. In addition, the impact of the focus on bioterrorism on other critical areas of research needs to be made clearer. In choosing to put so much emphasis on one area, what is forfeited elsewhere?The articles in this issue provide solid information, measured debate, and sophisticated discussion on science-related aspects of biosecurity. What we desperately need is an equivalent dialog at the policy level.Richard Gallagher, Editor rgallagher@the-scientist.com

Choices on Biosecurity

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