Let's Find Out Who Will Use It Before We Waste A Billion Dollars

The tragic loss of the space shuttle Challenger has not only disrupted the U.S. space program, it has also disrupted the process for planning the program. The current debate over the manned space station and the commercially developed space facility, an unmanned platform that would be launched and serviced by the shuttle in the early 1990s, is symptomatic of the present disarray. NASA’s problem is that it continues to employ a supply-side policy of investing in space. This is true for both the large manned space station and the industrial space facility (ISF). The development of hardware for the space station, for example, is far ahead of the development of experiments for the station. The science community that is dependent on NASA funding is properly concerned that, as with the shuttle, the station budget will make demands on NASA’s budget at the expense of planetary and space science. The industrial space facility appears to be another example of such supply-side space policy. NASA wants to go ahead, even though no one has a clear sense of user requirements and priorities. The ISF is touted both as a near-term low-cost replacement for the space station and as a bridge to the development of the station. While one of these characterizations may be right, they cannot be simultaneously true. And until the facts are in, it would be unwise to proceed much further with the industrial facility. Gone Public Space Industries Inc. originally presented the ISF as a purely commericial undertaking, and as such it enjoyed widespread political support in Washington. But early this year, the Reagan administration endorsed the idea of providing significant financial support—$700 million in government guarantees to lease 70% of the facility’s capacity. With the government having such a prominent role in its financing, it has become increasingly difficult to characterize the venture as a commercial undertaking. No one doubts that the talents and resources of the private sector are vitally important in the continued strength of the American presence in space. It is also clear that the government should act to encourage further private involvement. But financing everything that we want to do in space is impossible. Any action must be carefully considered and thoughtfully planned. We are on the verge of making a billion-dollar decision on the industrial space facility on the basis of limited and inadequate information. We don’t yet know if the facility will be an important contribution to the future of the United States in space—or a pointless diversion of resources. We do know, however, that in the clear judgment of the market, it has clearly negligible commercial potential in the near term. So why the push to go ahead now? One of the major justifications for the orbiting laboratory is the opportunity to do research and manufacturing in extremely low gravity. But the ISF is but one of a number of systems that could be available for microgravity research in the 1990s. NASA has added several flights to the shuttle manifest dedicated to the U.S. Microgravity Laboratory which can be fitted into existing Spacelabs. The Spacehab project, a module that can be put into the shuttle’s payload bay and which is commercially financed, should afford greater opportunities for smaller microgravity payloads. And the Extended Duration Orbiter, which is simply a shuttle with the capability to remain in space longer than the current version, could further enhance flight opportunities for microgravity research. There are also a number of alternative space platforms. Leasecraft, a project designed by Fairchild a few years ago; the European Space Agency’s Eureca; and Spas, being planned by the Germans, would be launched and recovered using the space shuttle. Others, such as TOPAS and Space Courier, projects now being built in Germany, would be lifted into orbit on conventional rockets and return samples in capsules. All of these alternatives are much cheaper than the ISF. The industrial space facility could be worth building if it had special abilities that make it better than these alternatives. But arguments by Reagan administration officials to the contrary, three recent studies on possible payloads and experiments for the facility suggest otherwise. Last year’s study by the Centers for the Commercial Development of Space suggests that almost all of the prospective materials science payloads for the space facility could be accommodated on the shuttle. Only an experiment in protein crystal growth required longer periods of microgravity than could be provided by the shuttle or an Extended Duration Orbiter. Similarly, NASA’s December 1987 “Report on the Potential NASA Utilization of the Space Industries Partnership Industrial Space Facility (ISF)" found that with the exception of a small number of experiments, the ISF did not offer unique capabilities. The third study, by Teledyne-Brown Engineering, did identify a variety of microgravity experiments for the ISF. But the company is still in the process of comparing the facility to possible alternatives. Clearly, the nation’s need for the commercially developed space facility is far from proven. As a result, the administration’s push to begin working on the facility can only be read as purely political decision—and a potentially disastrous one as well. It is reasonable to speculate that the Commerce Department and NASA simply want to lock up research contracts before the next president—who might have more doubts about the ISF-comes into office. John Pike is Associate Director for Space Policy at the Federation of American Scientists in Washington, D.C. He recently testified on the ISF before the Home Space Science and Applications Subcommittee.

Let's Find Out Who Will Use It Before We Waste A Billion Dollars

Interested in reading more?

Become a Member of