U.S. Could Benefit Greatly From Aiding Ex-Soviet Scientists

These individuals, and others like them, worked on classified military research. None favors nuclear proliferation, but each has the potential to make substantive scientific and engineering contributions to weapons programs in what have come to be known as the "rogue nations" of the world--Iraq, for example. But they also have the potential to contribute to the United States gross national product. Fortunately, they are in the U.S. at the moment, seeking productive employment in the research and development, science, engineering, and technology communities. They are ambitious, energetic, and willing to accept entry-level positions to obtain U.S. experience, to build their professional contacts and reputations, and to start new lives. They came here recently as refugees, immigrants, or those in search of political asylum. And they serve as examples of new talent available to the U.S. that can deter or prevent--at modest cost to American citizens--weapons proliferation, including nuclear weapons. A U.S. foreign policy that keeps highly experienced, well-educated weaponeers away from rogue-nation proliferators would be a valuable contribution to worldwide nonaggression. A step in the right direction is the recently announced formation of a Western-financed "clearinghouse," aimed at helping nuclear scientists find jobs in the former Soviet Union. But as for emigre scientists, U.S. employers can hire Georgi, Sergei, Aleksandr--and thousands of others like them. It wouldn't be the first time the scientific resources of a former adversary were used to foster U.S. progress; remember "Operation Paperclip," which brought Wernher von Braun and his team of Nazi rocket scientists to America after World War II. Practically speaking, the U.S. could reduce the potential threat to peace with the adoption of incentives, a new tax policy or credit, that would encourage U.S. employers--including science and technology companies, engineering and manufacturing firms, academic and research institutions, and even the U.S. government--to hire selected weapons scientists from the former Soviet republics. Normally, U.S. corporations deduct 100 percent of their employees' wages. We propose a new incentive for the nation's corporations to hire ex-Soviet weapons scientists: Allow 200 percent of their salaries to be deductible. Here are some benefits: * The employer would hire highly trained talent at great bargains. (For example, an entry-level scientist's salary of $25,000 would qualify for a tax deduction of $50,000; in the 40 percent corporate tax bracket, this would be an employer credit of $20,000.) * Those ex-Soviet weapons scientists would be given the chance of a lifetime to work in the U.S., to eventually earn citizenship, and to build a new life. * U.S. policy objectives are advanced. The machinery for resettling refugee scientists and engineers is in place. And the judgment of world opinion would be favorable: The U.S. does not merely talk about nonproliferation--it responds enthusiastically to clear opportunity. Following are some inevitable objections to our proposals (along with our responses to them): * "We must not use U.S. tax structure as a device in advancing national policy." (Why not? We already use tax incentives as an instrument of such policy; consider the tax-deductibility of charitable donations.) * "We must not interfere with the internal affairs of foreign countries." (Why not? We are eager to see U.S. businesses develop in the new Commonwealth of Independent States, in Japan, in the European Community.) * "We must not entice foreigners into the U.S." (But isn't there abundant precedent? Indeed, for decades, thousands of the Soviet Union's best scientific personnel fled persecution to find refuge in America. Already, owing to the Immigration Act of 1990, we are positioned to accept some 700,000 individuals a year. What would happen if a few thousand more would seek safe harbor in the U.S.?) * "There wouldn't be a way to screen out those who are not really scientifically qualified, the opportunists." (There are enough bureaucratic functionaries--experts in the U.S. military establishment, for example--who could be called upon to scrutinize candidates for inclusion in the program.) * "Unemployed U.S. citizens will say that such a policy unfairly penalizes them." (This is a virtual emergency we're dealing with--and it calls for extraordinary, one-time relief.) * "The costs of supporting the beneficiaries of these changes in American tax and immigration policy--once they have assumed residency in the U.S.--would be prohibitively high." (The experience of domestic resettlement programs with similar populations indicates that each new emigre from the former Soviet Union costs about $500 per month for their first five months, then drops to about $200 per month thereafter. With scientists like Georgi, Sergei, and Aleksandr, about five months, on average, will elapse before they find work in or near their narrow specialties. Total cost to the U.S. taxpayer is about $20 million to $50 million.) Richard A. Eisner is managing partner, Richard A. Eisner & Co. Inc., a New York City accounting firm specializing in high-technology companies. Stephen Rosen is chairman of the Science & Technology Advisory Board, a nonprofit organization chartered to help emigre scientists and engineers to market themselves and their products to U.S. employers. ==== Date: March 30, 1992 ...But America Must Not Sacrifice It's Own Scientific Establishment A number of major problems of urgent concern to United States and other Western scientists, governments, and foundations are linked, directly or indirectly, to the breakup of the Soviet Union. They pertain to the conditions of economic and political instability that now exist, and the fact that--with the end of KGB and military police controls--scientists of the former USSR are now free to move about, change jobs, travel abroad, and even emigrate. One problem has to do with the disposition of the former USSR's nuclear weapons, materiel, and trained nuclear weapons specialists. Another concerns the future of the once world-class institutes of the former Soviet Academy of Sciences and such other research hubs as the Kurchatev Atomic Energy Laboratory. In the past, these centers produced Nobel-level work (and prizes), but they are now, more than ever, crippled by lack of hard currency for supplies, equipment, repairs, and Western journals, and by the loss of scientific staff. Compounding these problems is the fact that a movement of world-class scientists and mathematicians to the United States and other Western countries has occurred. Although varying in quality and quantity, this movement--and how to deal with it--calls to mind the cases of scientists fleeing fascist tyranny in the 1930s and 1940s, and how a unified nation copes with such a trauma. In coping with the dilemma, the United States must factor in another consideration, or problem; that is, the very tight job market now prevailing for new United States Ph.D. and postdoctoral scientists, whose difficult situations could be exacerbated by the pressure of scientist-immigrants from Eastern Europe and the former USSR. Given the magnitude and urgency of these problems, the responses of U.S. government and foundation authorities have been, in my opinion, inadequate. Proposals have been made to send money to keep the ex-Soviet scientists in place. Nuclear scientists in Russia and the other newly defined nations, for example, would busy themselves disassembling their weapons and addressing their minds and equipment to peaceful tasks. The proposals are justified by how cheap this endeavor would be. Top Russian scientists now are paid 1,000 to 2,000 rubles a month--equal to $10 or $20--and that would be, according to some minds, the bargain-basement price tag on this talent. A moment's reflection should convince one that this is nonsense. The newly freed scientists--just like their Western counterparts--will look for competitive market salaries in other labs in their country, in the West, or in some so-called rogue country (Iraq is a convenient example) that has the store of petrodollars and ambitions to go nuclear. The ex-Soviet scientists have speedily embraced an alternative, and the westward option for financial improvement is clearly in the works: Some ex-Soviet scientists today are enjoying permanent positions at Harvard University, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and other top U.S. and European laboratories and universities; and inquiries are being received daily from still more of these scientists in search of permanent positions. Hundreds have already left their former Soviet Academy institutes, and others are anxiously looking for any decent opportunity to transfer to the West. In considering all of this--and in considering what I will propose--the following should be taken into account: The engineers and scientists of the Soviet nuclear installations have what is probably the worst environmental safety record in the world. That they have recklessly dumped radioactive wastes, contaminated the atmosphere, and concealed nuclear accidents are now all on the record. The New York Times (Feb. 15, 1992) referred to one Soviet Union site as "the most polluted spot on earth." I have heard reports that the contaminated topsoil around Chernobyl was buried about one meter deep and covered by fresh earth in which vegetables were planted; so Ukrainian farmers and consumers have been eating "hot potatoes" for years. Moreover, until not too long ago, forced labor was used to keep these nuclear facilities in operation, with many scientists recruited from the "sharashka"--KGB "guests" imprisoned for one reason or another. Common sense tells us that most of any U.S. funds sent to these installations will end up in the pockets of the same corrupt and inefficient managers who still are in place and ultimately were responsible for both the pollution and the use of forced labor. But even if all of those in charge of the labs were honest and efficient, the U.S. could not possibly afford to part with the tens of millions of dollars--at least--that would be needed to preserve the ex-Soviet research facilities. Their equipment is simply too badly in need of repair or replacement, their computers are simply too old and obsolete, and so forth. Sending funds to save those facilities is the wrong answer; we must allow the labs to evolve according to the inner dynamics of the Russian or other societies' needs--and their ability to support them. My proposal is that we focus on saving not the ex-USSR science establishment, but the scientists. Post-World War II experience provides a guideline: With "Operation Paperclip," for example, the U.S. invited German rocket scientists to work on projects in American laboratories. The U.S. did not give funds to keep rocket research going in Germany in 1945; nor, if memory serves, did it fund German scientists to disassemble their weapons in Germany. Any plan to do so, however, must not be at the expense of U.S.-trained Ph.D. researchers. At the forefront of any proposal must be the recognition that the U.S. desperately needs a younger generation of Americans and colleagues educated at U.S. institutions to take up science with a reasonable expectation that the better and more talented will find employment in the research field. While we welcome immigrant scientists who bring with them their valuable talents, we must make sure that U.S.-trained scientists do not suffer. It seems to me that the key to solving the problems associated with the availability of ex-Soviet scientists is to create additional jobs in the U.S.--to be filled by immigrant researchers--without diminishing career opportunities for American scientists. We should, for example, provide tax incentives for private industry to establish and expand basic research laboratories, where ex-Soviet scientists would be employed. We should expand existing national labs--at Brookhaven, Los Alamos, Livermore, and here--and create still more of them, charged with, for instance, developing renewable energy sources, finding efficient ways to avoid environmental degradation, and improving weather forecasting. We should establish special funding programs that would put the immigrant scientists into the U.S. educational system--from grade school up through the postdoc level--as a measure to improve the nation's science and math capabilities and thereby nurture a future generation of American researchers. In a nutshell, I contend that the U.S. apply whatever investment it is capable of making in saving the ex-Soviet scientists--and it should forget about saving the scientific establishment of the defunct USSR. It is not in the U.S.'s power to do more than this. Of course, my proposal cannot be carried out on the cheap. A significant commitment of money, along with rational planning, is needed; but the investment will more than pay off for the U.S.in new technologies and science-based improvement in the quality of life for Americans. Joseph L. Birman is Distinguished Professor of Physics at City College and City University of New York. He has visited the USSR 11 times since 1969, as a guest of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, to lecture, participate in conferences, and co-organize joint U.S.-USSR symposia.

U.S. Could Benefit Greatly From Aiding Ex-Soviet Scientists

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