Why I Walked Away From Star Wars--And A Good Job

Opinion Why I Walked Away From Star Wars--And A Good Job AUTHOR: RICHARD RUQUIST Date: May 16, 1988 Years before the term Strategic Defense Initiative had been coined, no one was more enthusiastic about a defensive missile shield than Richard Ruquist. The questions seemed purely technical back then, and Ruquist was an engineering bloodhound on a hot trail. But after scores of analyses, the scientist concluded that it was a terrible mistake—that a defensive system in space would be vulnerable and destabilizing. He took the unprecedented step of leaving the defense community to become a Star Wars critic. We asked him to tell his story: On February 28, 1987, I resigned from-a major Strategic Defense Initiative contractor in-order to be free to publicly criticize SDI. It was a decision which has profoundly affected me, my family, and my career. I believe it was also an unusual decision; while I am not the first to criticize SDI policy, I may be the first to leave the defense establishment in order to do so. The story begins, in 1966. New Ph.D. from Harvard in hand he began working on ballistic missile de fense systems at MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory. Nearly two decades before Ronald Reagan made such work controversial, scientists like myself could count on secure funding. But I also sincerely believed our efforts might be of crucial importance in controlling the nuclear arms race. Many of us thought that a defensive shield could make nuclear warheads obsolete, although none of us knew. whether it was technically possible. In the 1970s, I moved over to the AVCO-Everett Research Laboratory, the birthplace of a number of high-powered lasers. I strongly advocated the use of lasers because they seemed to provide the only real chance of intercepting missiles quickly enough to make the system work. My own analyses showed that unlimited amounts of power can be propagated through space from ground-based lasers. It was a key step forward, because it had previously been thought that there were limitations on the amount of energy that could be transmitted. My enthusiasm for these exotic weapons continued unabated well into the 1980s, in spite of the criticism that followed President Reagan’s 1983 announcement of the SDI initiative. My colleagues and I frankly didn’t pay much attention to the debate. There hadn’t been much growth in the field for decades, and everyone was excited about increased funding and the chance to find out if a defensive shield would really work. But the summer of 1986 was the turning point. I became aware of secret, computer simulations suggesting that satellites in space are inherently vulnerable. My employer at the time, Sparta Inc., had produced a sophisticated simulation that seemed to prove that SDI was remarkably effective. While the Soviets could blast a large hole in a satellite shield, the study showed, the hole would close quickly enough for the system to still intercept 999 out of every 1,000 incoming Soviet ICBM's The simulation brought Sparta a lucrative SDI contract. But it was a snooker. If the Soviets were craftier and spread out their anti-satellite attacks, the large hole would not close, allowing significant numbers of ballistic missiles to strike the United States. At the same time, conservative congressmen led by Wyoming senator Malcolm Wallop were proposing an immediate deployment of a partial defense system composed only of rocket interceptors based in space, a system that was clearly vulnerable. Since the Soviets would respond by building anti-satellite weapons, I realized, the system could only be effective if the United States launched a first strike. Only if a large number of Soviet ICBMS were first eliminated could a thin space defense system intercept a Soviet attack. It had finally dawned on me that a defensive system necessarily enhances first-strike capability. I admit this with some chagrin, since the concept had been well publicized during the early 1970s. I had previously conceded that Star Wars could not defend the entire U.S. population against a massive Soviet first strike. Now I was forced to conclude that SDI was both vulnerable and destabilizing. Trying to swallow my doubts, I continued on the job. After all, Star Wars was then just a research program and any deployment in space was in the distant future. Then in February 1987, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger endorsed the early deployment scheme proposed by Senator Wallop. I knew that I could no longer refrain from publicly criticizing SDI—and that meant leaving the defense establishment. The most important factor in my decision was not the cold logic of the system’s uselessness, vulnerability, and destabilizing presence. Instead, it was the image of thousands of rocket interceptors continuously orbiting the earth above our heads. It was not the kind of world I wanted to live in. With trepidation, I wrote an angry letter of resignation to Sparta. "Missiles in space [arel an invitation to war,"I wrote. "Therefore I vow actively to oppose their deployment." I sent letters protesting the early deployment policy to SDI officials, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to senators and congressmen. I also tried to get support from arms control organizations. At first, I had trouble just getting anyone’s attention. But by April,. I had joined forces with the Union of Concerned Scientists; in June, I presented my analysis of the vulnerability of the early deployment system at a Union press conference. Shortly thereafter, I became a. visiting scientist in MIT’s Program in Science and Technology for International Security. The weeks before I left Sparta were filled with anxiety and uncertainty. But I was surprised to discover that life "on the outside" was relatively quiet and free of doubts. My day-to-day work habits, and even the actual work, have not changed appreciably. I continue to look for problems and flaws in Star Wars systems by analyzing their technical aspects, and to write proposals—now sent to foundations instead of the government—to support that work. The only problem has been making ends meet. I did not anticipate the small amount of funding available in the arms control community. Nor did I realize that what little money there is goes only to research on policy matters rather than to technical analysis. My total income for the past year has been $100 So now I am in a quandary In February, President Reagan admitted that far from being just a defensive weapon, an operating Star Wars system would give its owner a powerful reason for launching a first strike. Since the president himself now apparently agrees with me, I wonder how I can expect my family to continue making financial sacrifices so that I can try to publicize the same criticism. In fact, I am now facing another major decision. Since I wish to oppose space-based defense systems by means of technical analysis, and since I cannot get support for this analysis outside the defense establishment, why not plunge back in and try to influence the system from the inside? It seems rational, even possible. Now I am ready to try re-entry. I’m interested to see what kind of reception I get. A visiting scientist at MIT Ruquist is currently looking for gainful employment.

Why I Walked Away From Star Wars--And A Good Job

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