The NRC Puts Safety Second

The first anniversary of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in April refocused world attention on the safety of nuclear power. The Union of Concerned Scientists recently released Safety Second (Indiana University Press, 1987), a critical study of the US. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's first decade. In this excerpt from the book, the union outlines its recommendations for improving the NRC so that safety comes first. The goal of Congress in establishing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission was to alter the institutional dynamics of the regulation of civilian nuclear power by freeing the regulators from the inherent conflict posed by being both regulators and promoters of the technology. The NRC's performance during its first decade indicates that the approach has not succeeded. The act of dividing the Atomic Energy Commission in two has not had the results hoped for. This outcome was foreshadowed in the new agency's first official act, when it adopted en masse the regulations of its predecessor. The great majority of the NRC's senior personnel are likewise holdovers from the AEC. The Union of Concerned Scientists believes that the record of the first decade demonstrates that the NRC's primary and instinctive allegiance is still to the industry it regulates. Such newer regulatory bodies as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration were born out of a movement to protect the public health and environmental quality; the NRC's historical roots are far different. The AEC's primary task was to bring a civilian nuclear power program into being, to show that the technology invented only for destruction could be adapted to peaceful uses. The regulatory side of that mission was always a stepdaughter. The two most consistent patterns of NRC behavior throughout its first decade illustrate the continuance of that mind-set: the agency's disinclination to resolve safety problems and its resolute hostility to public participation. The one period when this pattern was briefly broken was in the aftermath of the accident at Three Mile Island. The agency has since reverted to form—indeed, a strong case can be made that it has regressed as a result of a combination of institutional inertia and the political agenda of the Reagan administration. The measures we recommend to improve the NRC and enhance the protection of the public are incremental and reflect our view of what is possible in today's political climate. They are based on the assumption that, under the current commissioners, it is not realistic to expect meaningful change in the makeup or institutional instincts of the agency. Under these circumstances, change must come from two other directions: a heightening of public awareness and oversight of the agency's activities, and the establishment of firm non-discretionary standards in legislation. Improving the NRC's substantive performance requires a two-pronged approach. First, the agency must be made to come to grips with the underlying technical safety problems. Second, the NRC must be made to adopt a much tougher attitude concerning the standards of performance and behavior it expects of licensees. Our Recommendations Our first two recommendations relate to the resolution of generic safety problems and would require that safety problems be resolved by clear deadlines and that operating plants be modified accordingly, also on a firm schedule. 1. Clear deadlines for the resolution of unresolved safety issues should be established by Congress. 2. The NRC should require the prompt installation of improvements necessary to meet minimum safety requirements at operating plants, regardless of the cost. The second set of recommendations would set a framework for rational, accountable regulation for the next generation of nuclear plants, should the industry overcome the economic hurdles and the lack of public confidence that now face it. The premise of these recommendations is that important safety advantages can be gained from standardization of nuclear plant design but that, in order for these theoretical advantages to be achieved, the regulatory system must avoid making the same mistakes that have plagued the current generation of plants. In particular, the submitted design must be complete and final and the NRC's review must be thorough, with the resolution of all unresolved safety problems as a condition of approval. In addition, public participation must be encouraged and enhanced. Without these conditions, the risk is great of standardizing unsafe designs that perpetuate past failures. These two recommendations are designed to be applicable to either standardized or individual designs, since the basic principle of thorough review before construction should in any case be a precondition for new plants. 3. The current process for issuing a construction permit should be modified to allow the issuance of a single combined construction-operating license for the plant. The final design should contain the level of detail presently required in an operating license application and must be free of generic defects. A mandatory public hearing would be held, as is now required for a construction permit. No construction at the site would begin until the combined construction-operating license is issued. The NRC would specify unambiguously the design details and construction procedures it approves in the combined license. 4. Current pre-operating license reviews should be modified. Upon completion of the plant's construction, a hearing should be required to confirm that the plant has been built as designed, that the applicant is capable of safely operating and managing the plant, and that the level of emergency preparedness at and around the plant is adequate. No issues within the scope of the hearing held before issuance of the combined construction-operating license would be reopened unless important new safety questions have arisen since the original permit was granted. Our third set of recommendations is designed to provide systematic, independent oversight of the activities of the NRC and to enhance the effectiveness of public participation. These recommendations reflect a belief that increasing the accountability of the agency to Congress and the people will improve its performance and a conviction that the agency as presently constituted has failed to firmly enforce its own regulations or aggressively investigate and penalize misconduct. 5. Congress should establish within the NRC an Office of Inspector General, who should report directly to Congress and should have the power to investigate allegations, subpoena persons and documents, and refer criminal cases directly to the Justice Department. 6. Congress should establish an independent, presidentially appointed Nuclear Safety Board, modeled in part after the National Transportation Safety Board, to investigate the causes of accidents and near misses ("precursors") and to review operational experiences that indicate current or potential safety problems. 7. The NRC should provide financial support for public participation in its proceedings. To ensure that important safety issues are fully and fairly considered, the NRC should reimburse competent intervenors "who contribute materially to rule-making or licensing efforts by pressing significant concerns that are not being urged by other parties Alternatively, the NRC should establish an Office of Public Counsel. 8. The operations of the Committee to Review Generic Requirements should be recast. Decisions on whether to backfit safety improvements should be made through an open process subject to the government in the Sunshine Act. Outside experts, from independent groups and from industry, should be invited to address technical issues. 9. The NRC's inspection and enforcement budget, along with staff levels in its Office of Investigations, should be increased. We conclude by reaffirming our belief that the NRC's underlying problems start at the top, with the attitudes of the commissioners themselves. If the commissioners demand the resolution of generic issues and a responsive and tough regulatory agency, they will get them. Unfortunately, the converse is also true. Without firm, intelligent, dedicated leadership from the commissioners and the highest levels of the NRC staff, institutional and procedural reforms can too easily be circumvented. Ultimately, the president and the Senate—through the selection of commissioners—are responsible for the NRC's performance. In this respect, the Union of Concerned Scientists is not optimistic about the future. In the absence of proper presidential leadership, Congress must assume a more assertive oversight role to see that the NRC lives up to its safety-first mandate. The address of the Union of Concerned Scientists is 1616 P St., N. W, Suite 310, Washington, DC 20036. Copyright © 1987 by the Union of Concerned Scientists. Reprinted by permission of the publisher. Indiana University Press.

The NRC Puts Safety Second

The Scientist Staff

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