Interpol pushes research controls

Interpol, the international police organization, has launched a campaign to encourage countries to regulate and oversee biological research as well as to register and track laboratory equipment that might be used to construct biological weapons. Countries should pass new laws to create "national oversight mechanisms" and to impose civil and criminal penalties "to encourage compliance or reduce the risks that terrorists or would-be terrorists get access to these materials," said Ronald K. Noble, Interpol secretary general, in a July 15 talk to the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Law and National Security. "It is legal in most nations to acquire and even to weaponize pathogens," Noble said. "Because creating a biological weapon is not illegal, police and other law enforcement personnel lack the authority to investigate and interdict such catastrophic preparations at the earliest stages."Ronald Atlas, immediate past president of the American Society for Microbiology (ASM), applauded Interpol's intentions but was troubled by some of the recommendations being discussed. "There are issues that would cause great concerns in the scientific community," Atlas told The Scientist. Among them are recommendations to oversee research, to license and track common lab equipment, and to establish civil penalties that might have a lower threshold of guilt than would criminal penalties.Following the September 11th attacks and the anthrax mail incidents in the United States, Atlas and other ASM officials worked extensively with Congress, the Bush administration, and the scientific community to help shape bioterrorism-related legislation that would be palatable to most life science researchers. "The concept of making biosecurity international is a very good idea," Atlas said. "We have a model system in the US, and building on that internationally would be good. But if they try to go backwards, doing things that we've already decided would be inappropriate, that would not be productive." Scientists and academics "have varying degrees of standards in which they use their pathogens, how they are stored, who has access to them, and the kinds of procedures they have in place," said Noble, who is also a law professor at New York University. "We should have a goal that tries to bring people into compliance rather than penalize people for not being in compliance," he said.Toward this end, new laws should have civil components to prevent scientists from being turned into criminals "simply because their record keeping might not have been the best," he said. "We have to develop model laws and encourage countries" to implement them. Numerous recommendations to regulate scientific research have been made in the past. John Steinbruner, a University of Maryland arms control expert, has called for an international body of scientists and public representatives to authorize any scientific research having grave social consequences.Most of Interpol's 181 member nations lack adequate security mechanisms to regulate potential bioterror materials, said Barry Kellman, law professor and director of the International Weapons Control Center at DePaul University. "The US is not the problem. Terrorists seeking bioterror materials will probably look to the weakest link available. Many of the procedures used in these other countries are very lax."Kellman has consulted with Interpol to draft a model "template" of legal measures that countries should use to prevent "disease weaponization." Recommended measures include: government regulation of and control over biological research activities; oversight of "dangerous research"; registration, licensing, and electronic tracking of equipment and materials; registration of entities and facilities handling pathogens; and background checks, substance abuse and psychological tests for anyone having access to listed pathogens.Atlas, a microbiologist and dean of the University of Louisiana's graduate school, said similar recommendations came up during discussions leading to passage of the USA Patriot Act of 2001 and the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, the main regulatory framework affecting scientific research of pathogens in the United States. Some lawmakers had wanted to register, license, tag, and electronically track laboratory equipment, even down to centrifuges and flasks, he said. "We were not able to identify any bioweapons-related equipment that is not in common dual use everywhere," Atlas said. ASM successfully argued against this and other provisions, leaving the issue of bioterrorism research oversight largely to self-regulation. "We instead support the idea of having listed agents and a registration process for labs with the appropriate vetting of individuals who would be given access" to pathogens, Atlas said. Under the Bioterrorism Preparedness Act, labs must be registered with the Department of Health and Human Services or with the Department of Agriculture. Under the Patriot Act, "restricted" persons cannot have access to bioterrorism-associated agents. "Some people are still concerned [these restrictions] will adversely impact research," Atlas said. "But ASM felt it could be implemented and the balance that's needed could be achieved."Interpol plans to organize a series of workshops for law enforcement officials, scientists, and health professionals to discuss these issues, Noble said. One such forum for discussing ways to bridge the life sciences and law enforcement will be held in late October or early November in Lyon, France. "Scientists and law enforcement need to talk with each other and discuss these issues," Kellman said. "There needs to be a dialogue."

Interpol pushes research controls

Global effort to crack down on bioterrorism raises concerns

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