CDC, DEBORA CARTAGENARecent news recounting the lapses and failures of high-profile laboratory programs serve to highlight the critical role that biorisk management plays in ensuring public health and safety. First, it was uncovered that several time-forgotten vials of freeze-dried smallpox virus were discovered in an aging storage facility on the campus of the National Institutes of Health (NIH) in Bethesda, Maryland. Shortly thereafter, it was revealed that a relatively benign strain of “bird flu” was cross-contaminated with the dangerous H5N1 strain at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). In a separate incident reported by the CDC, several dozen lab workers were potentially exposed to anthrax. In response to these events, CDC Director Thomas Frieden announced that the agency’s avian influenza and anthrax laboratories would cease activity until safety and security issues were reconciled.
The recent news of these failures in security at two of the world’s most reputable and well-respected institutions is unsettling, especially given the potentially severe consequences of mishandling infectious agents and toxins. The public’s alarm is somewhat justified, in consideration of the “anthrax letters” in 2001, and a biocontainment lab depressurization at CDC in 2012. Smallpox is one of the deadliest diseases in the history of humankind, and its use as a biological weapon dates back centuries. Even more concerning is the fact that, because smallpox was eradicated as a clinical disease in the 1980s, we now have a human population that is extremely susceptible to smallpox exposure.
What lessons can we learn from these recent incidents at the CDC and NIH? The good news ...
